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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 31, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 4 
Cert to CA 6 (Lively, 
Martin, and Peck; p.c.) 
No. 80-332 
RHODES Federal/Civil Timely 
v. 
CHAPMAN 
1. SUMMARY: The question presented involves the propriety of 
the DC's ruling that double celling in the Southern Ohio 
Correctional Facility (SOCF) violated the Eighth Arnendmeent's 
proscription against c~uel and unusual punishment. 
2. Facts and Pr9._ceedings Below: This class action alleged 
that numerous facets of institutional life at SOCF violated the 
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/-') Eighth Amendment. Among the com~laints was one directed at the 
practice of double celling prisoners in cells designed for single 
occupancy and measuring between 63 and 68 square feet. 
Approximately 1400 of the 2300 inmates were double celled. The 
institution was designed to hold only 1600 inmates and double 
celling was requ1red to accomodate the larger than anticipated 
inmate population. 
C 
SOCF was built in 1973. The DC found it to be a modern, 
first rate insitution. Food services, ventilation, lighting, 
plumbing, sanitation, law library and classroom facilities, 
medical services, visiting privileges and guard to inmate ratio 
were all adequate. Due to the overcrowding, however, full time 
jobs were not fully available, some inmates had had educational 
opportunities delayed and the number of psychologists and social 
workers had not increased with the increase in population. There 
was an increase in violence, but that was due to the size of the 
prison population not to double celling. The DC rejected all of 
the prisoners' contentions except the allegation that double 
celling violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against 
cruel and unusual punishment. The factors which led the DC to 
find a constitutional violation were: (1) SOCF is a maximum 
security prison housing individuals convicted of serious 
felonies; (2) The inmates at SOCF are long term; (3) SOCF was 
holding 38% more prisoners than the prison's rated capacity; (4) 
The cells were designed to hold one ~erson and the size of these 
cells was incompatible with expert recommendations that there be 
a minimum of fifty square feet per occupant; (5) A substantial 
~--- ___ .,.._,, _ _..,.......,.._., 
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number of prisoners were required to spend substanially all of 
their time in the cells; ( 6) This double celling is not a 
tempcrary measure. The court ordered a reduction of the inmate 
population by 25 persons per month until the ·population is 
reduced to 1,700. By the time the court entered this order the 
population had already been . reduc'° to 2000. 
In a brief per curiam, theVcA 6 affirmed. That court 
explained that the DC had not held that double celling was per se 
unconstitutional. The lower court's conclusion was directed only 
to the facts of this case. The findings of fact were not clearly 
erroneous and the conclusions of law derived from those findings 
were permissible. 
3. Contentions: The petr phrases the question presented as 
follows: "Whether the double celling of prison inmates 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment where the record 
indicates that the practice does not depreve inmates of minimum 
constitutional guarantees to adequate food, clothing, shelter, 
sanitation, medical care and personal safety." This phrasing 
both begs the question and overly simplifies the DC holding. The 
core issue is whether double celling is constitutionally adequate 
shelter in light of the factors considered significant by the DC. 
Yet petrs attempt to press the argument that the DC has 
formulated a per se constitutional rule invalidati ~g double 
celling. Accepting that premise, the argument is that the 
holding is inconsis~ent with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) 
which disavowed the existence of a "one man, one c e ll" principle 
-r· -- •. - ·--· Jo 
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C in the due process clause and with numerous circuit court 
opinions which have upheld double celling. For example, in Hite 
v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1977), the CA 4 specifically 
held that double celling in cells designed for single occupancy 






Resps counter that the DC's holding is based upon the 
totality of the circumstances presented by these facts and is, 
therefore, not in conflict with the rule of law announced by any 
federal court. In fact, Bell v. Wolfish, although relying on the 
Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment since Bell 
involved pretrial detainees, supports this approach: 
While confining a given number of people in a 
given amount of space in such a manner as to 
cause them to endure genuine privations and 
hardship over an extended period of time might 
raise serious questions under the Due Process 
Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to 
punishment, nothing even approaching such 
hardship is shown by this record. 
441 U.S. at 542. 
Similarly, the CA- 4 has not foreclosed the possibility that 
double celling could violate the federal constitution: 
In Hite v. Leeke we held that "double-celling," 
the housing of two prisoners in a cell initially 
designed for single occupancy, was not itself a 
violation of the Constitution. It, of course, 
may be a relevant factor when other consequences 
of overcrowding create deprivations or impose 
unusual restrictions and disadvantages upon the 
prison population. 






4. Discussion: The resps are correct that there is no 
conflict in the circuits with respect to whether double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. Although in the prison context 
courts have adopted various tests to assess the constitutional 
implications of the alleged deprivations (~; shocks the 
conscience or evolving standards of decency), when addressing a 
particular problem such as double celling the question is framed 
in terms of the totality of the circumstances. There is no 
conflict on this very generalized plane. However, on the facts 
of this case, the circuits may very well be in conflict as to the 
appropriate result. The CA 6 result certainly seems more 
solicitous of prisoners' rights than does the CA 4 result in the 
factually similar case of Hite v. Leeke. This difference may be 
due to the DC's reliance on an "evolving standards of decency" 
approach to assessing the totality of the circumstances. Yet, 
the DC does cite language seeming to approve a shock the 
conscience test. Indeed, the DC opinion affirmed by the CA 6 is 
quite odd. From the DC's description of the prison and 
recitation of the applicable law one is left with the definite 
impression that the lower court is going reject the 
constitutional challenge. The conclusion that double celling at 
SOCF violates the Constitution is at odds with the tenor of the 
opinion. The only factor that would seem to justify the 
conclusion is that a substantial number of prisoners spend 
substantially all of their time in t~ese cells. Yet the lower , 
court rejected petr's proposed solution of building dormitories 
which would have alleviated this problem. Thus it ~ay be that 
_..,. ____ ,,_ .. ,/, 
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0 ~ the DC was more concerned with overcrowding than with double 
C 
celling; but that is not the focus of the opinion. 
Although I am sympathetic with the DC's view of optimal 
prison conditions, I have doubts that federal law is meant insure 
that all prisons meet the ideal standards proposed by penological 
experts. The Court may want to look .at this case as a vehicle to 
define the scope of federal couit involvement in state prison 
reform. The DC's approach certainly opens the door for 
continuing involvement . by federal courts so long as penological 
philosophies continue evolve. On the other hand, the absence of 
a published CA opinion may make this case less than compelling. 
The remedy imposed by the DC is not harsh. 
There is a response and a reply as well as an amicu$ brief 
from the State of Oregon urging the Court to grant the petn. 
10/16/80 Ides Opns in petn 
October 31, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 . . . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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Motion of Petitioners to be 
Excused from Supplementing 
the Record 
CA 6 CHAPMAN 
SUMMARY: f h
. . ~~f 
The State o O 10, seeks leave to disp~ with the 
printing of parts of the joint appendix proposed by the resps, who ~ 
are proceeding ifp. 
FACTS: On Nov. 3, the Court granted cert to consider the scope 
of federal court in vol vemen·t in state prison reform and in particular 
whether double celling in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
(SOCF) violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel 
\ 
and unusual punishment. Petr argues that the DC formulated a per se 
constitutional rule invalidating double celling and resps argue that 
the DC's decision was based on the totality of conditions demonstrated 






Petr designated for the joint appendix the lower court decisions 
and its plan for compliance. Resps seek to include more than 230 
additional pages of material into the printed appendix at a cost to 
petr of approximately $5,000. Resps seek to include summaries of 
evidence and specific pages of testimony and exhibits. 
PETR'S CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that a printed appendix is 
expensive and should be limited to the relevant pleadings and orders. 
Petr alleges that the items designated by resps consist of "raw 
evidence which was introduced to the trial court" and part of a 
transcript from a remedy hearing conducted eight months after the 
DC judgment. Petr notes that all the items are included in the trial 
record which will be on file with the Court. 
RESPS' CONTENTIONS: In their opposition, resps admit that the 
items they designated are portirnsof the evidence and testimony pre-
sented at trial. Resps argue that this evidence is necessary to 
show the basis of the district court's decision and will form the 
basis of their statement of the case. 
DISCUSSION: Although Rule 30.1(4) allows an appendix to contain 
"any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the 
court's attention," Rule 30.2 concludes with the following paragraph: 
In making these designations, counsel should 
include only those materials the Court should exam-
ine. Unnecessary designations should be avoided. 
The record is on file with the Clerk and available 
to the Justices, and courisel may refer in their 
briefs and oral argument to relevant portions of 
the record that have not been printed. 
Normally the scope of the appendix is not a major issue as the cost 
• 
of the appendix may be taxed as costs in the case (Rule 30.3). How-
ever, where resps are proceeding ifp, petr is unlikely to recover 
costs regardless of the Court's decision on the merits. 
- 3 -
The issues that the Court appears to be interested in do not 
necessitate that portions of the evidence before the trial court be 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
February 24, 1981 
No. 80-332: Rhodes et. al v. Chapman et. al 
Question Presented 
The question in this case is whether double-
celling at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
,the Eighth Amendment. 
·' 
.. 2 • 
Background 
Petitioners are officials of the State of Ohio, 
and one is the warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility (SOCF), a maximum-security pentientiary built in 
the early 1970's. Respondents are the 2300 prisoners in 
SOCF. As a class, they sued under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 
seeking injunctive and monetary relief for the conditions 
of their confinement. They claimed that "double-celling" 
at SOCF subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Purporting to decide 
on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances," the 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Hogan, 
J.) held that double celling at SOCF "overly and on 
balance .•• is unconstitutional." 
7 
I 
The District Court listed five facts upon which ~ 
it based its constitutional decision. First, double- ~ 
celled respondents are "long term" prisoners. According 
to the court, this fact can accentuate the problems of 
close confinement. Second, more prisoners are housed in 
SOCF than the prison was designed to hold. Specifically, 
the prison now contains 38 % more prisoners than its 
"design capacity." Third, double-celled prisoners must 
share approximately 63 square feet of living quarters. 
• 
3 • 
The court found that several district courts and advisory 
councils have recommended no less than approximately 55 
square feet per prisoner. Fourth, double-celled prisoners 
spend most of their time in their cells with their 
cellmates. 1 Fifth, double-celling at SOCF appears to be a 
permanent practice, not merely a temporary measure to 
accommodate a sudden increase in prison population. 
To remedy the constitutional violation that it 
had found, the District Court ordered that petitioner 
reduce the inmate population at SOCF by 25 prisoners per 
trv,,,,r- 2-'5 () Q 
month until the population fell . to 1700 inmates. The 
-----. ·-· '\ 
court held that petitioner could decide whether to comply 
with this order by transferring prisoners, by reducing 
admissions, or by some other means. 
On petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals for 
/JC~ 
1specifically, the District Court found that~% of the 
double-celled prisoners are confined to their cells for 
all but 2-6 hours per week. As to the other 75 % of the 
double-celled prisoners, the court's findings are 
ambiguous. At one point in its opinion, the court found 
tnat tnese prisoners are locked in their cells only for 
the 9 1/2 hours between 9:00 pm and 6:30 am. Elsewhere in 
the opinion, however, the court found that these prisoners 
leave their cells for only 10 hours a day. It suffices to 
say that these double-celled prisoners spend much of their 
time closely confined with each other. 
> . 4. 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed by order. That court rejected 
petitioner's contention that the District Court had held 
double-celling to be per se unconstitutional. The Court 
of Appeals stated, "The district court listed in its 
opinion a number of considerations upon which it based its 
finding that double celling at the particular prison in 
question is unconstitutional. We do not read the opinion ~&,...-,, 
as holding that double celling is unconstitutional under ~ 
all circumstances." The Court of Appeals then stated, 
without reasoning, that the District Court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous and that its conclusions of law were 
reasonable. 
Discussion 
I find this case to be an easy one. 
reversing the Court of Appeals on the 
I recommend 
ground that 
respondents have failed to show that double-celling at ~ 
SOCF is a "cruel" punishment. 
---
My reasoning is as follows: 
To be a "cruel" punishment, double-celling at 
must cause some harm. Respondents have failed to '----------show that double-celling causes harm at SOCF. The 
District Court did not find any condition of confinement 




court found that conditions at SOCF generally are quite I\ ~ ________ ___, ___________ _ 
adequate. The court that the food, plumbing, lighting and ---"" --
ventilation are adequate at SOCF. It found that the 
medical and dental care is adequate and that respondents 
failed to prove any indifference to prisoners' needs. It 
found that no prisoners have been denied access to 
educational programs or the law library. It found that 
~
violence at SOCF has '\since double-celling began; but it 
also found that the increased violence only reflected an 
----
increase in population, not an effect of double-celling. ------ -------Similarly, it found that there were too few jobs available 
for prisoners, but it did not 'find that this was the 
result of double-celling. Simply stated, nothing in the 
District Court's opinion supports the conclusion that 
double-celling itself causes harm. 
r-- --- ~ 
Given the absence of evidence to show that 
double-celling causes harm, I find petitioners irrefutable 
when they argue that the District Court's opinion can only 
be read to hold that double-celling is per se 
unconstitutional. The five facts upon which the District - ....... Court expressly· relied do not support a conclusion that 
double-celling causes harm. Each of the facts -- (i) that 





that SOCF is populated 38 % over "design capacity;" (iii) 
that double-celled prisoners have less square feet of 
living quarters than advisable; (iv) that double-celled 
prisoners spend most of their time in their cells; and (v) 
that double-celling is not a temporary measure at SOCF --
supports the theory that double-celling causes harm which 
might prove to be both cruel and unusual. 
~
But there 
simply is no proof of harm in this case. As petitioner 
contends, these five facts are "self-evident concomitants -
of double-celling" which ptobably are present wherever -------- ---------
double-celling occurs. Brief at 17. ______ ___,, 
Because there is no proof of harm in this case, 
the District Court's judgment can only be affirmed on the 
ground that double-celling qua double-celling is cruel and 
unusual. Such a judgment would not be a constitutional 
decision, but a decision about the merits of penological 
means. Furthermore, I see no way to distinguish a 
decision about one penological measure from a decision 
about others. Thus, if the Court holds that double-
celling is cruel and unusual under the circumstances of 
this case, then the federal courts will be asked to review 
any number of other penological measures which, like 
double-celling here, produce no demonstrated harm. But 
7. 
see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). 
I therefore would hold that double-celling at 
SOCF does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it has 
not been shown to cause harm at that prison. This holding 
leaves open the possibility that double-celling is cruel 
and unusual in circumstances where it is proven to produce 
harm. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). I do not 
believe that the Court needs to address petitioners' 
further contention about the proper standard for 
evaluating prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment. 
Petitioners contend that prison conditions do not impose 
cruel and unusual punishment so long as the State provides 
prisoners with "the basic necessities of life." Brief at 
18. 2 Because double-celling has not been shown to cause 
harm, there is no need to consider whether double-celling 
that did cause harm would violate the Eighth Amendment if 
2petitioner relies for this proposition on Newman v. 
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (CA5 1977), cert. denied, 438 
U.S. 915 (1978), which held, "If the State furnishes its 
prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, 
shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so 
as to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, that ends its obligations under Amendment 
Eight." Accord, Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (CA2 
1978), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 
(1979). 
' .J ,' 
·' 
8. 
the State nonetheless were found to provide the basic 
necessities of life.3 
The precedents of this Court do not require the 
Court to do more than hold that there is no proof of 
"cruelty" in this case. The precedent most like this 
case, Hutto v. Finney, supra, does not articulate any 
legal standard that the Court must apply, even though the 
Court held that "[c]onfinement in a prison •.• is a form 
of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards." Id., at 685. That case involved challenges 
to several prison conditions, including confinement in 
"isolation cells." The Court's principal holding was that 
the constitutional violation, as found by the district 
court, supported the remedial order. As to the 
31n any event, petitioner's proposed standard is 
unhelpful because it begs the question in this case. By 
asking whether a prison which double-cells inmates has 
provided "adequate shelter, sanitation, and safety," 
petitioner merely asks whether double-celling, under all 
the circumstances, allows for "adequate shelter, 
sanitation, and safety." Petitioner's proposed standard 
merely substitutes a different vague question for the 
vague question that respondents ask: whether double-
celling, under the totality of the circumstances, violates 
concepts of "humanity and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Neither standard gives any 




constitutional violation itself, however, the Court merely 
accepted the district court's conclusion "that, taken as a 
whole, conditions in the isolation cells violate[d] 
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments." 
Id., at 687. Other cases in which jail conditions or 
practices have been challenged under the Eighth Amendment 
largely are inapposite.4 
4Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), involved double-
celling, among other conditions, at an institution housing 
unconvicted "detainees." The question in that case was 
whether double-celling constituted "punishment" prior to 
conviction in violation of the Due Process Clause, not 
whether it involved "cruel and unusual punishment" in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The detainees in Bell 
were double-celled for short periods of not more than 60 
days. Furthermore, the detainees generally spent only 7-8 
hours in their cells, and they presumably spent that time 
sleeping. The prisoners in the case now before the Court 
are double-celled for considerably longer periods of time, 
and they generally spend more hours per day confined to 
their cells. Thus, the holding in Bell that double-
celling did not constitute "punishment" in the 
circumstances of that case does not foreclose a claim that 
double-celling constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" 
in this case. But such a claim must be proven. 
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the 
question was whether a prisoner could claim under§ 1983 
that inadequate medical care had violated his Eighth 
Amendment right. The Court held "that deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain, ' . . • proser ibed by the Eighth Amendment." Id. , at 
104. The prisoner in that case proved that he had been 
harmed. Again, respondents here have not proved harm. 
10. 
In sum, I believe that the Court can hold that 
there is no II cruelty" in this case, and that the Court 
need not attempt to articulate a standard by which all 
prison conditions can be judged under the Eighth 
Amendment. The "cruel and unusual" standard is an 
extremely vague one; the Court need not consider in this 
case whether it should remain vague. 
Conclusion 
I recommend reversing the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Thus, the petitioners cannot fairly be said to have been 
deliberately indifferent to some harm. 
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e y , 1apman et a . 
[April -, 1981] 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the housing of two 
inma,tes in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. 
JI 
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are 
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF'), 
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They 
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action 
in the District Court for the Southern :Oistrict of Ohio on 
beha,lf of thems.elves and all inmates similarly situated at 
SOCFo Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
they contended that "double celling' ' at SOCF violated the 
Eighth Amendment. The gravamen of their complaint was 
that double celling confined cellmates too clpsely. It also 
was blamed for ov/;'lrcrowding at SOCF, said to have over--
whelmed the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respond-
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor1 double celling has 
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's state-
wide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have 
continued. Fllrthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's imly maximum-security 
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons 
has <:reated special p'roblems for the recipient prisous. Tr. of Oral Arg, 
·', ., 
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ents sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio 
officials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from 
housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as · a tempo-
rary measure. 
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about 
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the 
court's own observations during an inspection that it con-
dtJcted without advance notice. 434 },.- Supp. 1007 (1977). 
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate popula-
tion, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends 
that these findings are erroneous. 
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620 
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day 
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber 
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field, 
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described 
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class 
facility." Id., at 1009. 
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. 
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-
type night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold 
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from 
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered 
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent 
near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that 
1nmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, 
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the 
5--6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at 
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979). 
2 ElOCF's library. contains 25,000 volumes, includ.i-ng law books, and was 
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in 
quality and quantity." 434 F Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court 
described SOC:F''s clai;srooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at 
1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify 
them as a laundry, machine shop, i:;hoe factory, sheet metal shop, prin'i 
sho~; sign l5hop, and en~ine-repair shop. See iii,) at 1010 .. 
t, 
8()-332-0PINION 
RHODES v. CHAPMAN a 
cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can 
be seen. 
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks 
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m. 
According to the District Court, "[t]he day rooms are in a 
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that 
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each 
day room cont11ins a wall-mounted television, ca.rd tables, 
and chairs. Inmates can · pass between their cells and the 
day rooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour, 
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened. 
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that 
SOCF began receiving inmates in late l 972 and double cell-
ing them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term 
!entences for first-degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 in-
mates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the 
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their 
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits, 
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent 
more time looked in their cells because of a restrictive 
classification. 8 
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed 
'respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double 
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food 
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced 
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed 
1 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not !Substantiate 
their. fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their· 
cells all but 6 hours a week Inmates cla::,sified as "voluntarily idle" and 
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week 
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci-
plinary· reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a. week to, 
a,tten,d ret.tiow servicea, a movie,. or the cammisllll:ry .. 
4 
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula .. 
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade .. 
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the 
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the 
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling 
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the 
day rooms or visitation facilities, 4 nor had it rendered inade-
quate the resources of the library or school rooms. 5 Al-
though there were isolated incidents of failure to provide 
medical or dent.al care, there was no evidence of indifference 
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 0 As 
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of vio-
lence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but 
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respond-
ents failed to produce evidence establishing that double cell-
ing itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to 
iumates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability of-
fered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did 
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates 
than jobs, had "waterr ed] down" jobs by assigning more in-
mates to each job than necessary and by reducing the num-
ber of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also 
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists 
and social workers since double celling had begun. 
4 The court noted that SOCF ib one of the few maximum tlecurity 
pri:son:s m the country to permit contact visitation for all inmat~. 434 
F. Supp, at 1014. 
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to in-
mates in pro1ective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access 
to court. A,, to school, no inmate who wai; "ready, able, and willing to 
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was 
som~ delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id., at 
1015. 
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial 
backlog of inmate5 needing routine dental care, but the dental staff treated 
·emergencies. Id ., at lOHi. 
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the Dist.rict 
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
The court rested its conclusion Oll five considerations. One, 
inmates at SOCF are serving long terms of imprisonment. 
In the court's view, this fact "can only accent[ uate] the 
problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 
1020. Two, SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of 
trial than its "design capacity." In reference to this the 
court asserted, "Overcrowding necessa.rily involves excess 
limitation of general movement as well as physical and men-
tal injury from. long exposure." Ibid. Three, the court ac-
cepted as contemporary standards of decency several studies 
recommending that each person in an institution have at least 
50-55 s,quare feet of living quarters.7 In contrast, double 
celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square feet. Four, the 
court asserted that "[a] t best a prisoner who is double celled 
will spend most of his time in the cell with his cellmate." 8 
Five, SOCF has made double celling a practice; it is not a 
temporary condition.0 
7 The Di::;trict Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual 
of Standard::; for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27 
(1977) (60-80 square feet); National Sheriffs ' Assn., A Handbook oh Jail 
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet) ; National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Pri::ioners, 
§ 1 (50 square feet). 
8 The court's as::iertion a::; to the amount of time that inmates spend 
in their cells is not ::mpported by its findings. The court found that 
75% of the double celled inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their 
cells from 6:30 a . m. to 9:30 p . m. There is nothing in the findings to 
suggest how many hour8 most inmate::; in fact spend in or out of their 
cells. 
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into ::;ingle 
cells or release them, as respondent:; urged, the Di.;trict Court initially 
ordered petitioners to "proceed with rea::;onable dispatch to formulate, 
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at 
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each 
of wlµch the court rejected. It thi,m orq.ered petitionerf> to reduce the 
0 
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must 
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed; 
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that 
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the 
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opin-
ion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible 
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response 
to the violations found.1° 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portanc~ of the question to prison administration. - U. S. 
--. (1980). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes upon the conditions in which 
a State may confine those convicted of crimes.11 It is un-
questioned that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form 
of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amend-
ment standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 
(1978); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); 
cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979). But until this 
case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the 
conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment.12 Nor have we had an occa-
inmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell 
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for 
Cert., at A- 39. 
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order 
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980). 
11 The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Robin.son v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). 
12 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison admiuis-
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sion to consider specifically the principles relevant to assess .. 
ing claims that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth 
Amendment. We look, first, to the Eighth Amendment 
precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a 
State's authority to impose punishment for criminal conduct. 
A 
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words 
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the 
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punish-
ments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 
(1890) . Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punish-
ments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 
su'{Yra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 
(1910).13 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of 
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the question was 
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth Amendment does not 
apply to rublic school disciplinary practices. In considering the differ-
ences between a prisoner and !L schoolchild, we stated, "Prison brutal-
ity ... is 'part of the total punislnnent to which the individual is being 
subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiuy.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976). 
13 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such. Robinson v. Calif omia, 370 
U. S. 660 (1992). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involved 
. in this , case, 
8 
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tion." Gr€g(J v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976). 
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine 
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for 
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." 1'rop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that 
"Eighth Amendment judgments sho:·ld neither be nor appear 
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. R1:rnrnel v. 
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Con-
stitution contemplates that in the end [a covrt's] own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 
597 (plura.Iity opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182' 
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] should be in-
formed by objective factors to tbe maximum extent possi-
ble. '" Rumrnel v. Estelle, supra,, at 275, quoting Coker v. 
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example, 
when the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked 
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of 
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. 
Georgi,a, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgi,a, supra, at 593--
596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib-
erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and 
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the 
common law and state legislatures, that "[a] n inmate must 
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the 
authorities fail to do so. thoEe needs will not be met." 429 
U. S., at 103. 
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement 
comporn the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve 
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they 
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ranty imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held 
that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because, 
in the worst case, it Cf:l,n result in physical torture, and, even 
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any peno-
logical purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the 
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted 
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in un-
questioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs. 
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or 
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel 
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency 
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But 
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under 
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the 
e~tent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, 
they ftre part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for 
their offenses against society. 
B 
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its con-
clusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one 
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim. 
The double celling made necessary by the increase in prison 
· population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation. The closeness of the confine-
ment did not increase violence among inmates or create other 
. conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Although job 
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a 
result of qouble celling, limited work hours and delay before 
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary 
and wwton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not 
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amend-
ment fro~ its language and history to hold that delay of 
these desirable aids. to rehabilitation violates the Constitution. 
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'fhe :five considerations on which the District Court rl:llied 
also ard insufficient to support its consfitutional conclµsion. 
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served 
by inmates at SQC:f; the fact th~t SOC})' hol.lsed 38% more 
inmates thap itis ·"design capacity"; the recommendation of 
several · studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square 
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double qelled in .. 
mates spep.d most of their time in their c~Ils with their cell-
mateis; and the fact that double celling at SOC:F was not a 
temporary conditio11. Supra, at -. These general con-
siderntions 'fall 'fa.r short in themselves of proving cruel and 
unusut1,l punishment, for there is no evidence that double 
·celling under these circumstances either inflicts· unnecessary 
or wJ1,nton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the :;;everity 
of crimes warranting imprisonµient.u At most, these con-
siderations amount to a theory that doubl~ celling inflicts 
pain,1 G Perhaps they tefleot an aspiration toward an .ideal 
14 R~pondents and the Distri'ct Court ~rred ip assuming tµat opinions 
of e,~verts as fo desir,aple prison conditions suffice to establish contem-
porary standar\is of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful a.nd relevant with respect 
to some questions, but "they simpiy do · not establish the con.:ititutional 
minima; rather, they establish goals recomn\ended by the orga11ization in 
qu~tio~1." See Dept. of ju:st1ce, Federal $tandards for Prison:s and Jail~ 
1 (1980) . Indeed, geperalized opinions of eJperts c11nnot weigh as heavily 
in determining contempon1ry ~tandards pf dec1mcy as ''the pubµc ~ttitude· 
toward a give~ sanction!" Qregg v. Gwi-yta, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint 
opinion) . There was no evidence in this case that double celling h, 
viewed ~en~rally as 'violating decency. It Jtl ~pt unmr4al for many p~r., 
sons not confined in pri1:1ous, and not always coxnpelled by poverty, to 
occupy sleeping qt1arterl:! that could be viewed a~ less favorable than those 
at issue ip thi::i cal:!e. 
15 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double cellipg for 
long periods crnatei; a dangeromi potential for frU1:1tr11,tion, tension, and 
violence. In respondents' view, it would be at) inf!ictlon of unnecessary 
nd. wanton pu.in if double cellmg led to rioting. The danger of prison 
riots i:s a ~erious concern, shared by the public as weU as by prison au~ 
tbn,it1es and, inmattiso. l3ut . resl?ondents' co'!.l.tention doeti not lea~ m dre: 
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~nvironment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of 
SOCF's ty17e, wtiich house persons convicted of serious 
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considera-
tions prope~ly are weighed by the legislature and prison ad-
ministration ratl1er than a court. There being no constitu-
tional violation, the District Court had no authority to con-
sider whether 'double celling in light of these considerations 
was the best response ' to the increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population, 
III 
Courts must proceed cautiously in making Eighth Amend-
ment judgments because "[a] decision that a given punish-
ment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot 
be reversed short Qf a constitutional amendment," and thus 
" [ r] evisions cannot be made in the light of further experi-
ence." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176. In assessing 
claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, 
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from 
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them 
must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best 
to operate a detention facility." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 539.16 
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual. The Dis-
trict Court's findings of fact lend no support to this claim. Moreover, a 
pri,mn's internal security is peculia.rly a matter normHlly left to the dis-
cretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, s'Upra, at 551, and 
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, 4a3 U. S. 119, 
132-133 (1977) ; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 827 (1974). 
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of pri:;on 
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974). 
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisom; and Jails, 
5 vols. (1980) . It suffices here to repeat that 
"The problemi, of prii,ons in America are complex and intractable, and, 
more to the point, they are not readily sw;ceptible of resolt.Jtion by decree. 





Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel 
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons, 
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplora-
ble" and "sordid." Bell v. WoZ.fish, 441 U. S., at 562. When 
c.onditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, 
"federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitu-
tional rights." Prpcunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 405-
406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) (per 
curwm). In discharging this oversight responsibility, how-
ever, courts cannot assume that stat~ legislatures and prison 
officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment or to the perplexing sociological problems of how 
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal 
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and 
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens. 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, 
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of 
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact re-
flects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405. 
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 568 (1974); Junes v. North 
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977). 
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and 
administration have been exacerbated by the increa::,;e of serious crime 
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities. 
This ca;;e is illustrative. Ohio t!esigned and built SOCF in the early 
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be :~ modern "top-
flight, first-class facility/' Supra, at -. Yet, au unanticipated increa:,;e 
in the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at 
issue. According to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three 
factors influence prison population: the level of arrests, prosecution poli-
cies, and sentencing and parole deci~ion::1. Because these factors can 
change rapidly, while prisons require years to plan and build1 it is ex-
tremely difficult to calibrate a prison's "design capacity" with predic-
tions of prison population. Memorandum of the United. States as Amicus.: 
'C,~riae ,31 6 •. 
,.,1..,: . , . 
•·. 
'. . ... 
'• 
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In this case, the question before us is whether the condi-
tions of confinr,ment at SOCF are crueland um.isual. As we 
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed. 
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Dear Lewis, 
Assuming your willingness to make the ver-
bal changes we disccused on the telephone, I am 
glad to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
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April 23, 1981 
Re: 80-332 - Rhodes v. Chapman 
Dear Lewis: 
It seems to me that there may be a danger in 
relying on the absence of evidence of rioting to 
support the conclusion that confinement of two 
persons in a small cell is not cruel and unusual 
punishment. It is at least theoretically possible 
that prisoners in a truly barbarous concentration 
camp might be too intimidated to riot. Moreover, 
I would hesitate to send out a signal to a community 
of prison litigants that a few good riots would 
improve their litigation posture. In all events, 
I shall wait to see what Bill Brennan writes before 
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April 23, 1981 
RE: 80-0332 Rhodes v. Chapman 
Dear John: 
~ n..,-'..,.Je. ~ h' ~~ ;z;.,, . 
<{/ The reference to respondents argument that double 
celling creates 
eJ 
addresx only in 
a dangerous potential for violence is 
Note 14, p. 10. 
Your letter, as I understand it, makes two points. 
First) that it is theoretically possibly in a truly 
"barbarous concentration camp" to intimidate inmates to the 
poin t where t hey would not riot. If we had such a 
concentration camp before us, it wou~ s and other 
reasons violate the eighth amendmen l 
Your second point is that we should "hesitate to send 
out a signal" to prison inmates that a few riots would 
improve their chances to litigate successfully. I was 
addre~ nly the facts of this case, in which there is no 
evidence at all of violence thereof 
- : /,;...,j r '."+ r~r: r-i."~;;;) 
. --- - ··- . ·-· .... -------
'• 
'•. 
> ' ,. 
,, . 
··~ 
Would it be helpful to your concerns if I changed the 
fourth and fifth sentences in the footnote to read as 
follows: 
J 
"but respondents contention does not .. -
lead to the conclusion that double celling at 
SOCF is cruel and unusual, whatever may be 
the situation in a different case. The ~ 
District Court Is findings of fact es.Ciie. lend .... _ -
no support to respondents claim in this 
case." 
I assume that you are not suggesting that~ e-ea1:1ae- of'¥ 
~ 
the possibility of rioting (t~ I suppose exists at every 
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Although I agree with your conclusion that the District Court 
was in error in this case, I am concerned that your opinion might 
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No. 80-332 
lames A. Rhodes et al.,l . . . . 
Petitioners On Wnt of Certiorari to the Umteq 
' States Court of Appeals for th~ 
v. Sixth Circuit. 
l{elly Chapman et al. 
[April -, 1981] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the housing of two 
inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional { 
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are 
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), 
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They 
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on 
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at 
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the / 
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that 
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was 
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed 
the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respondents 
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has 
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's state-
wide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have 
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security 
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons 
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sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offi-: 
cials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from hous-
ing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary 
measure. 
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about 
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the 
court's own observations during an inspection that it con-
ducted without advance notice. 434 )?. Supp. 1007 (1977), 
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate popula-
tion, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends 
that these findings are erroneous. 
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620 
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day 
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber 
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field, 
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described 
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class 
facility." Id., at 1009. 
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. 
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-
type night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold 
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from 
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered 
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent 
near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that 
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, 
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the 
5-6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at 
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979). 
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and was 
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in 
quality and quantity." 434 F . Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court 
described SOCF's classroom::; as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at 
1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify 
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print 
shop; sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010. 
• 
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cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can 
be seen. 
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks 
and are open to inmates between 6:30 a. m. and 9:30 p. m. 
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a 
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that 
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each 
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables, 
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the 
day rooms during a IO-minute period each hour, on the hour, 
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened. 
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that 
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double cell-
ing them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term 
sentences for first-degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 in-
mates were double celled. Of these, about 75 % had the 
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their 
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits, 
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmatee spent 
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive 
classification. s 
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed 
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double 
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food 
was "adequate ih every respect," and respondents adduced 
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed 
8 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate 
their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their 
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and 
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week 
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci-
plinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week to 
'attend religious services, a movie, or the commissar.y. 
,. ~. 
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula~ 
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade~ 
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the 
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the 
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling 
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the 
day rooms or visitation facilities,4 nor had it rendered inade-
quate the resources of the library or school rooms. 5 Al-
though there were isolated incidents of failure to provide 
medical or denta.I care, there was no evidence of indifference 
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs.6 As 
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of vio-
lence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but 
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respond-
ents failed to produce evidence establishing that double cell-
ing itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to 
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability of-
fered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did 
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates 
than jobs, had "water[ed] down" jobs by assigning more in-
mates to each job than necessary and by reducing the num-
ber of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also 
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists 
and social workers since double celling had begun. 
4 The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security 
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434 
F. Supp., at 1014. 
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to in-
mates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access 
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to 
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was 
somo delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id., at 
1015. 
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial 
backlog of inmates needing routine dental care, hut the dental staff treated 
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District 
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and I 
unusual punishment. The court, rested its conclusion on five 
,considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms 
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only 
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and over-
crowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more in• 
mates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In 
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding neces-
sarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well 
a~ physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid. 
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of de-
cency several studies recommending that each person in an 
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters.7 
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square 
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who 
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with 
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac· 
tice; it is not a temporary condition.0 
7 The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual 
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27 
(1977) (60-80 square feet); National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail 
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 
§ 1 ( 50 square feet). 
8 The court's assertion as to the amount of time that inmates spend 
in their cells is not supported by its findings. The court found that 
75% of the double celled inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their 
cells from 6:30 a. m. to 9:30 p. m. There is nothing in the findings to 
suggest how many hours most inmates in fact spend in or out of their-
cells. 
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single 
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially 
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate, 
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at 
SOCF." 434 F. Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each 
,o_f which the court rej_ected.. It then ordered petitioners to i:educe the· 
0 
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must 
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed; 
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that 
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the 
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opin-
ion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible 
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response 
to the violations found.10 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question to prison administration.. - U. S. 
- (1980). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the l 
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. Californ-ia, 370 U. S. 
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State 
may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned 
that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment 
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards." 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 ( 1977) ; cf. Bell v. W ol,fish, 441 
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not con-
sidered a disputed contention that the conditions of confine-
ment at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.11 Nor have we had an occasion to consider spe-
inmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell 
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for 
Cert., at A-39. 
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order I 
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980). 
11 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison adminis-
trators -did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the conditions 
(,w1 0,,;,rul 
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cifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that con-
ditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We 
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the gen-
eral principles that are relevant to a State's authority to irn .. 
pose punishment for criminal conduct. 
A 
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words 
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the 
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punish-
ments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 
(1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punish-
ments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 
supra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 
(1910).12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of 
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was 
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel and l 
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering 
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison 
brutality ... is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is 
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976). 
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such. Robinson v. California, 370 
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involvefi 




tion." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976). 
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine 
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for 
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that 
"Eighth Amendment judgments shodd neither be nor appear 
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. R1,mmel v. 
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Con-
stitution contemplates that in the end [a corrt's] own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182 
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment.[s] should be in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum extent possi-
ble.' " Rummel v. Estelle, supra,, at 275, quoting Coker v. 
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example, 
when the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked 
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of 
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593-
596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib· 
erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and 
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the 
common law and sta.te legisla.tures, that "[a]n inmate must 
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the 
authorities fail to do so, thoEe needs will not be met." 429 
U. S., at 103. 
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement 
compoEe the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve 
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they 
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime war-
' . ' ' 
,, 
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-rantf imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held 
-that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because, 
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even 
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any peno-
logical purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the 
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted 
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in un-
questioned and serious deprivations of basic hl'ma.n needs. 
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or 
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel 
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency 
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But 
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under 
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the 
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, 
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for 
their offenses against society. 
B 
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its con-
clusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one 
of- the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim. 
The double celling made necessary by the increase in prison 
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation. The closeness of the confine-
ment did not increase violence among inmates or create other 
conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Although job 
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a 
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before 
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary 
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not 
punishments. We would have to wrern•h the Eighth Amend-
ment from its language and history to hold that delay of 
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied 
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. 
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served 
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more 
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of 
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square 
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled in-
mates spend most of their time in their cells with their cell-
mates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a 
temporary condition. Supra, at -. These general con-
siderations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and 
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double 
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unneceSEary 
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of crimes warranting imprisonment.13 At most, these con-
siderations amount to a theory that double celling inflicts 
pain.14 Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal 
13 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions 
of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contem-
porary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect 
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional 
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in 
que,,;tion." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 
1 (1980). Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily 
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude 
toward a given sanction." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint 
opinion) . There was no evidence in this case that double celling is 
viewed generally as violating decency. It is not unusual for many per-
sons not confined in prisons, and not always compelled by poverty, to 
occupy sleeping quarters that could be viewed as less favorable than those 
at issue in this case. 
14 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for 
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and 
violence. In resJJondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary 
and wanton pain if double celling led to rioting. The darger of prison 
riots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison au-
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,environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu.,-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of 
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious 
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considera-
tions properly are weighed by the legislature and prison ad-
ministration rather than a court. There being no constitu-
tional violation, the District Court had no authority to con-
sider whether double celling in light of these considerations 
was the best response to the increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. 
III 
Courts must proceed cautiously in making Eighth Amend-
ment judgments because "[a] decision that a given punish-
ment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot 
be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus 
"[r]evisions cannot be made in the light of further experi-
ence." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176. In assessing 
claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, 
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from 
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them 
must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how beet 
to operate a detention facility." Bell v, Wolfish, 441 U. S.1 
at 539.15 
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual. The Dis-
trict Court's findings of fact lend no support to this claim. Moreover, a 
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the dis-
cretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 551, and 
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, 433 U. S. 119, 
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 827 (1974). 
15 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison 
administration. Procunie1· v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974). 
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, 
5 vols. ( 1980). It suffices here to repeat: 
"[T] he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, 
morq to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. 
M~t ·r,eq_uire expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commit~ent ill° 
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Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel 
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons, 
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplora-
ble" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562. When l 
conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect 
constitutional rights." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) 
(per cur'iam). In discharging this oversight responsibility, 
however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and l 
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Con-
stitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how 
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal 
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and 
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens. 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, 
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of 
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact re-
flects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id,, at 405 (footnote 
omitted). 
See also Wolff v, McDonnell, 418 U. S, 539, 561-562, 568 (1974): Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977). 
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and 
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime 
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities. 
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early 
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "top-
flight, first-class facility." Supra, at 2, Yet, an unanticipated increase 
in the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at 
issue. According to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three 
factor8 influence prison population: the number of arrests, prosecution poli- · 
cies, and sentencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can 
change rapidly, while prisons require years to plan and build, it is ex-
tremely difficult to calibrate a prison's "design capacity" with predic-
tions of prison population. Memorandum of the United States as ,Amicus 
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In this case, the question before us is whether the condi-
tions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we 
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
io reversed. 




April 24, 1981 
r 
RE: 80-0332 Rhodes v. Chapman 
John: 
Thank you for your 
The reference to respondents argument that double cell-
ing creates a dangerous potential for violence is addressed 
only in Note 14, p. 10. 
Your letter, as I understand it, makes two points. 
First, that it is theoretically possibly in a truly •barba-
rous concentration camp" to intimidate inmates to the point 
where they would not riot. If we had such a concentration 
camp before us, it would of course violate the eighth amend-
ment for this and other reasons. 
Your second point is that we should •hesitate to send 
out a signal• to prison inmates that a few riots would im-
prove their chances to litigate successfully. I was ad-
dressing only the facts of this case, in which there is no 
evidence of violence reaching riot proportions. 
would it be helpful to your concerns if I changed the 
fourth and fifth sentences in the footnote to read as 
follows: 
•aut respondents contention does not lead to 
the conclusion that double celling at SOCF is 
cruel and unusual, whatever may be the situa-
tion in a different case. The District 
Court's findings of fact lend no support to 
respondents claim in this case." 
I assume that you are not suggesting that the 
possibility of rioting (which I suppose exists at every 
prison), justifies a per se rule against doubling celling. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
I .l<,1/IO .... v,-1....:::___,. ____________ ~--~-•--
' ; 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
ju:punu (!Jou:ri ttf tlrt ~b jmftg 
Jfi:w lfi:ttghm. ~. QJ. 2llffe'!' 
April 28, 1981 
Re: No. 80-332, Rhodes v. Chapman 
Dear Lewis, 
This will confirm that I join your opinion 
for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
, 
lfp/ss 5/1/81 Rider A, p. (Rhodes) 
If the views expressed in Mr. Justice Marshall's 
dissent were accepted, all former perceptions as to what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment would have to be 
revised radically. Indeed, the dissent seems oblivious to 
the fact that a purpose of imprisonment is punishment. This 
case involves a prison that is "unquestionably a topflight, 
first class facility", less than ten years old. 434 F. 
Supp. at 1009. As the District Court's findings make clear, 
it also is operated to provide a range of amenities that may 
be equaled in few other prisons. The unforeseen necessity 
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lfp/ss 5/2/81 Rider A, p. 11, fn. 14a (Rhodes) 
14a. The dissenting opinion states that "the 
facility described by [the court] is not the one involved 
in this case". Post, at The incorrectness of this 
statement is apparent from a comparison of the District 5 
Court's extensive findings of fact with those set forth 
above. See, ante, 1- , and fns. and 
In several instances, the dissent selectively 
relies on testimony without acknowledging that the 
District Court gave it little or no weight. For example, 10 
,. 
the dissent emphasizes the testimony of experts as to 
psychological problems that "may be expected" from double 
celling; it also relies on similiar testimony as to an 
increase in tension and aggression. 4 3 4 F • Su pp . , at 
1017. Id. The dissent fails to mention, however, that 15 
the District Court also referred to the testimony by the 
prison superintendent and physician that "there has been 
no increase [in violence] other than what one would expect 
from increased numbers [of inmates]". Id., at 1018. More 
psychological prot::Hems tnac ··may o-:: -="P"' ........ "' ... 
celling; it also relies on similiar testimony as to an 
increase in tension and aggression. 434 F. Supp., at 
1017. Id. The dissent fails to mention, however, that 15 
the District Court also referred to the testimony by the 
prison superintendent and physician that "there has been 
no increase [in violence] other than what one would expect 
from increased numbers [of inmates]". Id., at 1018. More 
tellingly, the dissent ignored the fact that the District 20 
I 







that there had been no increase in violence or criminal 
activity due to double celling; there has been [an 
increase] due to increased population." Id. This holding 
was based on uncontroverted prison records, required to be 2 
maintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and 
described by the District Court as being "detail [ed] and 
bespeak[ing] credibility." Id. 
There is some ambiguity in opinion of the 
District Court concerning the time double celled inmates 3 
were required to remain in their cells. The dissent 
relies only on selective findings: "That most inmates are 
out of their cells only 10 hours each day", 434 F. Supp., 
at 1013, and a substantial number of inmates are out only 
four-six hours a week." Post, at , n. 6. The dissent 
fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly 
inconsistent with a prior finding by the Court that 
inmates "have to be locked in their cell with their 
cellmate only from around 9:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m.", id., 
leaving them free to move about for some 14 hours. 
was based on uncontroverted prison records, required to be 
maintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and 
described by the District Court as being "detail [ed] and 
bespeak[ing] credibility." Id. 
There is some ambiguity in opinion of the 
District Court concerning the time double celled inmates 
were required to remain in their cells. The dissent 
relies only on selective findings: "That most inmates are 
out of their cells only 10 hours each day", 434 F. Supp., 
at 1013, and a substantial number of inmates are out only 
four-six hours a week." Post, at , n. 6. The dissent 
fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly 
inconsistent with a prior finding by the Court that 
inmates "have to be locked in their cell with their 
cellmate only from around 9:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m.", id., 
leaving them free to move about for some 14 hours. 
Moreover, it is unquestioned - and also not mentioned by 
the dissent - that inmates who spend most of their time 
. , . 
3. 
locked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive 
classification". These include inmates found guilty of 
"rule infractions [after] a plenary hearing," 424 F. 4 
Supp., at 1013, and inmates who "are there by 'choice' at 
least to some degree". 434 F. Supp., at 1013. 
It is to be remembered that this is a maximum 
~-
security prison, housing only persons guilty of violent 
and other serious crimes. It is ess_ential to maintain a 5( 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the housing of two 
inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are 
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), 
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They 
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on 
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at 
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the 
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that 
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was 
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed 
the prison's facilities and stafl'.1 As relief, respondents 
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has 
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's state-
wide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have 
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security 
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons 









RHODES v. CHAPMAN 
gought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offi .. 
oials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from hous-
ing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary 
measure. 
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about 
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the 
court's own observations during an inspection that it con-
ducted without advance notice. 434 }~. Supp. 1007 (1977). 
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate popula-
tion, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends 
that these findings are erroneous. 
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. · In addition to 1620 
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day 
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary; barber 
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field , 
visitation area, and garden. · The District Court described 
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight; first:..class 
facility ." Id., at 1009. 
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. 
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-
type night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold 
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from 
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered 
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent 
near the ceiling, and 960 of the ce1ls have a window that 
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, 
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the 
5-6. Thus, petitioners have au interest in resuming double celling at 
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979) . 
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and was 
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in 
quality and quantity." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977) . The court 
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at 
1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify 
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print 
shop, sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010. 
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ce-Jls one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can 
be seen. 
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks 
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m. 
According to the District Court, "[t]he day rooms are in a 
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that 
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each 
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables, 
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the 
day rooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour, 
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened. 
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that 
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double cell-
ing them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term 
sentences for first-degree felonies. Approximately l,400 in-
mates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the 
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their 
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits, 
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent 
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive 
classification.8 
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed 
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double 
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food 
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced 
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed 
8 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate 
their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their 
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and 
newly arrived inmates awaiting · classification had only 4 hours a week 
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci-
plinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week to 
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula-, 
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade., 
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the 
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the 
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling 
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the 
day rooms or visitation facilities,4 nor had it rendered inade-
quate the resources of the library or school rooms.~ Al-
though there were isolated incidents of failure to provide 
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference 
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 6 As 
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of vio-
lence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but 
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respond-
ents failed to produce evidence establishing that double cell-
ing itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to 
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability of-
fered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did 
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates 
than jobs, had "water[ ed] down" jobs by assigning more in-
mates to each job than necessary and by reducing the num-
ber of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also 
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists 
and social workers since double celling had begun. 
' The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security 
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434 
F. Supp., at 1014. 
n The court found that adequate law books were available, even to in-
mates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access 
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to 
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was 
some delay before an mmate received the opportunity to attend. Id ., at 
1015. 
, 6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial 
backlog of inmates needin~ routine dental care, but the dental staff treated 
emergencies. Id., at 10m. 
.. 
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District 
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and 
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five 
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms 
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only 
accent[ uate] the problems of close confinement and over-
crowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more in-
mates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In 
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding neces-
sarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well 
as physical a.nd mental injury from long exposure." Ibid. 
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of de-
cency several studies recommending that each person in an 
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters.7 
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square 
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who 
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with 
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac-
tice; it is not a temporary condition.9 
7 The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual 
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27 
(1977) (60-80 square feet); National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail 
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 
§ 1 (50 square feet) . ' 
8 The basis of the District Court's assertion as to the amount of time 
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the court's opinion. 
Elsewhere in it;; opinion, the court found that 75% of the double celled 
inmates at SOCF are free; to. be out of their cell:s from 6~30 a. m. to 
9 p. m. 434 F. Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated that it made this 
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate clai;sification, which 
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012. 
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single 
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially 
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate, 
propose, and carry out sotjle plan which will terminate double celling at 
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each 
' of which the court rejected. It then ordered petitioners to reduce the 
0 
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must 
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed; 
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that 
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the 
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opin-
ion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible 
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response 
to the violations found.10 · 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
p6rtance of the question to prison administration. - U. S. 
- (1980). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the 
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State 
may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned 
that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment 
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards." 
llutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not con-
sidered a disputed contention that the conditions of confine-
ment at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.11 Nor have we had an occasion to consider spe-
inmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell 
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for 
Cert., at A-39. 
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order 
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F . 2d 1099 (1980). 
11 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison adminis-
trators did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the conuitions 
, ,, 
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eifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that con-
ditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We 
iook, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the gen-
eral principles that are relevant to a State'~ a.uthority to im~ 
pose punishment for criminal conduct. 
A 
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words 
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the 
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punish-
ments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 
(1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punish-
ments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the 
unnecessa.ry and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 
su'{J1'a, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 
(1910).12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of 
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was 
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering 
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison 
brutality ... is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is 
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976). 
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such. Robinson v. Ca/,ifornia, 370 
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not invaived 
ln this case. 
8 
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tion." GrEgg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 u. s. 97, 103 (1976). 
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine 
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for 
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." · Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). · The Court has held, however, that 
"Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear 
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). · To be sure, "the Con-
stitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judg-
ment will be brought t6 bear on the question of the accepta-
bility" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgi,a, supra, at 182 
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] · should be . in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum extent possi-
ble.' " Rummel v. Estelle, supra, at ·275, quoting C-oker v. 
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example, 
when the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary va1ues, the Court looked 
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of 
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra, at -176-187; Coker v. Georgw, supra, at 593-
596. Our conclusion iri Estelle v. Gamole, supra, that .. delib-
erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and 
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the 
common law and state legislatures, that "[a]n inmate must 
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the 
authorities fail to · ao so, those needs Vi;ill not be met." 429 
U. S., at 103. 
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement 
comporn the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve· 
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can ·they 
. be grossly disprop·ottiomi.re to the severity of·th:e crim-e WaT-
,·4 .. . .. 
~-,. . , 
•' 
,, 
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ranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held 
tlrnt the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because, 
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even 
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any peno-
logical purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the 
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted 
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in un-
questioned and serious deprivations of basic ht:man needs. 
'Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or 
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel 
and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency 
'that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But 
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under 
contemporary standards a.re not unconstitutional. To the 
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, 
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay . for 
their offenses against society. 
B 
In view of the District Court's findings of, fact , its con-
clusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one 
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim. 
The double celling made necessary by the increase in prison 
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence 
among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for 
prison confinement. 434 F. Supp., at 1018. Although · job 
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a 
result of double celling, limited work hours and · delay before 
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary 
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not 
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amend-
ment from its language and history to hold that delay 01 
, these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the' Constitu'tio"f1. 
iO 
80-332-0PINION 
RHODES v. CHAPMAN 
The five considerations on which the District Court relied 
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. 
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served 
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more 
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of 
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square 
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double 'celled in-
mates spend most of their time in their cells with their cell-
mates; and the fact that · double ce1ling at SOCF was not a 
temporary condition. Supra, at -. · These general con-
siderations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and 
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double 
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unnecesrnry 
or wanton pain or· is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of crimes wa.rranting imprisonment.18 At most, these con-
siderations amount to a theory that double ce1ling inflicts 
pain.14 Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal 
13 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions 
vf experts as to drsirable prison conditions suffice to establish contem-
porary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect 
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional' 
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in 
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 
1 (1980). Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily 
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude 
toward a given sanction." Gregg v. Georgfo, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint 
opinion). There was no evid.ence in this case that d·ouble celling is 
viewed generally as violating decency. The cells are smaller than may bs l 
ideal, but they are exceptionally functional and modern: they are hrnted, 
ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and a sanitary toilet . Each 
cell also has a radio. 434 F. Supp., at 1011. Many parsons not confined 
in prisons, and not always compelled by poverty, would welcome compar-
able sleeping quarters. 
1'l Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for 
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and · 
violence. In respondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary 
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of 
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious 
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considera-
tions properly are weighed by the legislature and prison ad-
ministration rather than a court. There being no constitu-
tional violation,15 the District Court had no authority to con-
riots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison au-
thorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the 
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual. The Dis-
trict Court's findings of fact lend no support to this claim. Moreover, a 
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the dis-
crPtion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra. at 551, and 
11. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, 433 U. S. 119, 
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. S17, 827 (1974). 
15 The dissenting opinion states that "the facility described by [the 
Court] is not the one involved in this case." Post, at -. The incor-
rectness of this statement is apparent from a comparison of the facts set 
forth at length above, see ante, 2-4, and nn. 2-6, with the District Court's 
detailed findings of fact. See 434 F. Supp., at 1009-1018. 
In several instances, the dissent selectively relies on testimony without 
nrknowledging that the District Court gave it little or no weight. For 
rxample, the dissent emphasizes the tes•imony of experts as to rsycho-
logi0al prrb1ams that "may be expected" from double celling; it also 
relies on similar testimony as to an increase in tension and .<t@:gression. 
Id., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District 
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and 
physirian that "there has been no increase [in violence l other than what 
one would expect from increased numbers [of inrnatesl" Id., at 1018. 
More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-that the District Court 
resolved this conflict in the testimony by holding "that there had been 
no increase in violence or criminal activity increase due to double celling; 
there has been [an increase] due to increased population." Ibid. This 
holding was based on uncontroverted prison records, required to be 
maintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and desrribed by the 
District Court as being "detail[ed] and bespeak[ing] credibility." Ibid. 
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court con-
crrning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required to 
rt•main in their cells. The dissent, post, at -, n. 6, relies only on 
12 
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sider whether double celling in light of these considerations 
was the best response to the increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. 
III 
Courts must proceed cautiously in making Eighth Amend-
ment judgments because "[a] decision that a given punish-
ment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot 
be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus 
" [ r l evisions cannot be made in the light of further experi-
ence." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at176. In assessing 
claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, 
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from 
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them 
sclPctive finding:; that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours 
earh day, and tlrnt others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp., 
at 1018. The dissent fails to note that the fir:;t of the:;e findings ii; flatly 
inconsistent with a prior, twice-repeated, finding by the Court that in-
matrs "have to be locked in their crll with their cellmate only from 
around 9 :00 p. 111. to 6: 30 a. 111.," id., at 1013, 1012, leaving them free to 
move about for some 14 hours. Moreover, it i:; unquestioned-and also 
l!Ot mrntioned by the diosent-that the inmates who spend mm,t of their 
1unC' locked in their cells are thosr who have a "restrictive classification." 
Tlw:;r include inmate:; found guilty of "rulr infractions [after] a plenary 
beHring" nnd inmates who "are there by 'choice' at lem,t to some degree." 
Ibid. It mw,t be rnnmebered that SOCF is a maximum-security prison, 
liousing only persons guilty of violent and other ;,erious crimes. It is 
e~H(;'ntial to maintain a regime of close rnpervi8ion and discipline. 
The dissent also makes much of the fact that SOCF wa;, housing 38% 
more inmates at the time of trial than iti, "rated capacity." According 
to the United States Bureau of PrisonH, at least three factors influence 
pri~on population: the n11mber of arrests, prosecution policies, and sen-
lenring and parole decisions. Because these factorti can changP rapidly, 
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to 
enlibrate a pri:;on's "rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of 
pri,ou population . Memorandum of the United States as Arnicus Curiae 
;3, 6. The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF 
l!;lle~i,ed incorrectly about future priHon population, but whether the actnaI 
t'onditious of confinement at SOCF are cruel and mrnsual. 
' . . ,. 
' .. 
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must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best 
to operate a detention facility." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 539.16 
Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel 
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons, 
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplora-
ble" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562. When 
conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect 
constitutional rights." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) 
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility, 
however, courts cannot assume tha.t state legislat11res and 
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Con-
stitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how 
rn We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prii;on 
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974). 
Sec generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, 
5 vols. ( 1980). It suffices here to repeat: 
"[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex a.nd intractable, and, 
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. 
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, 
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of 
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact re-
flects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405 (footnote 
omitted). 
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977). 
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and 
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime 
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities. 
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early 
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "top- ~ . / 
flight, first-class facility." Supra, at 2. Yet, an unanticipated increase • 1 '0
,J fll(}yt:C>' 
_in . the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is /;\t 1 ,>fl I ] ) I / 
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best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal 
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and 
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
chance of being usefuJ, law-abiding citizens. 
In this case, the question b.efore . us is whether the condi-
tions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we 
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed. 
It is ~o -ordered. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,jnp:rttttt <qltlUi of tqt ~~ ,jbtlts 
,rasfringhln., ,. <q. 2.0~'!~ 
May 13, 1981 





Copies to the Conference 
". 
_;. ~.tr. f 
Dear 
I have done the "scrubbing" with respect to one 
the points you mentioned, and will recirculate. 
·
1 As to Trop v. Dulles, I do not feel justified in 
making a change. I had a clerk run T1op down on Lexis. It has been cited in at least 303 federa cases, and the 
precise phrase "evolving standards of decency" has been 'ffl; ·, 
quoted in 156 of these cases. The last opinions for the 
Court to quote the phrase are Ingraham v. Wright and Estelle 
v. Gamble, cases that I believe oth you and I joined. 
If we can pick up one more vote in Rhodes, 91v1ng 
us a 6-3 majority, I think my decision will help settle the 
law with respect to the "prison conditions" cases. 
Sincerely, 
'·l t· . 
C HAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~mu <!fo:url of tlrt '1tltt~ ~taus 
Jfasfyinght~ ~. <If. 2.llffe~$ 
May 15, 1981 
Re: 80-332, Rhodes v. Chapman 
Dear Lewis: 
I thank you for "scrubbing" the erroneous 
statement of the Gregg plurality. 
I can "live with" your Trop quote, which I 
find has been cited in only four Court opinions. 
With Hugo Black, in future I will resist this 
pleasing but extravagant rhetoric which has too 
much "rubber" in it to suit my taste and is 
reminiscent of the late unlamented (nonsense) 
language of Roth about "redeeming social 
importance".--
This game of rhetoric -- to which we are all 
prey at times -- is something that causes us 
trouble. For my part, I am always receptive to 
the use of the "Vanderbilt blue pencil." 
Justice Powell 
J l .t I 2. /-;;, ____<t-__ 
6-18-811 
Jo: The Chief Justlc~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justioe Stewart 
Mr. Justioe White~ 
tfr. Justioe 1'8.rsh 
Jtr. Justioe Blaokm 
Ir. Juatice R~hrrqui t 
llr. Justice Stevens 
trom: )Ir. Justice Powell 
C1reulated:-----
4th DRAFT Reoiroulated: MAY t 8 188t 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~ 
No. 80-332 
~a~es A. Rhodes et aJ.,
1 
. . . . 
·. Petitioners On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
1 States Court of Appeals for tho 
u ll Ch v. I Sixth Circui~. -
+~e y apman et a , · 
[April - , 1981] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the housing of two 
inmates in a, single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
- I 
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are 
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOOF), 
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. - They 
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on 
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at 
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. ·§ 1983, 
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the 
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was · that 
double celling confined cellmates too closely. · It also was 
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed 
the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respondents 
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has 
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's state-
wide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have-
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security 
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons· 
: bas ' c,eated special problems for the recipient prisons. Tr. of Oral Arg,. 
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sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio ofl}, 
cials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from hous-
ing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary 
measure, 
The District Court ma1e extensive findings of fact about 
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the 
court's own observations during an inspection that it con-
ducted without advance notice. 434 }~. Supp. 1007 (1917). 
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate popula-
tion, and effects of double c·elling, Neither party contends 
that these findings are erroneous. 
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. · In addition to 1620 
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day 
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissa.ry, · barber 
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field, 
visitation area, and garden. · The District Court described 
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class 
facility." Id., at 1009. 
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. 
Each contains a bed measuring -36 by ·so inches, a cabinet-
type night stand, a wall-mounted siiik with hot and cold 
running water, and a to'ilet that the inmate can flush from 
· inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered 
bunk bed. Every cell ha.s a· heating arid air circulation vent 
near the ceiling, and 960 of the ce1ls have a window that 
· inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, 
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the 
· 5-6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at 
SOCF. See Bell v. Wol/ts'h, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979), 
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and wa~ 
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," arid "superior in 
quality and quantity!' 434 F . Supp. 1007, · 1010 (1977) . · The court 
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." . Id., at 
1015. The court did not · describe SOCF's workshops except to identify 
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print· 
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'eells one wall consists of bars through which the inm~tes can 
be seen. 
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks 
and are open to inmates between 6:30 a. m. and 9:30 p. m. 
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a 
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that 
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living room or den." 1d., at 1012. Each 
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables, 
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the 
day rooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour, 
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened, 
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that 
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double cell-
ing them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term 
sentences for first~degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 in-
mates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the 
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their 
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits, 
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent 
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive 
classification. 3 
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed 
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double 
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food 
was "adequate in every respect/' and respondents adduced 
ho evidence uwhatsoever that prisoners have been underfed 
s Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate 
'their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their 
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" anil 
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week 
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci~ 
plinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week ttt 
·,attend religious services, a movie, or the commissary. 
,, ' 
' . 
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\ 
or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula,. 
'tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade-
quate, the cells were· substa;ntially free of offensive odor, the 
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the 
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling 
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the 
day rooms or visitation facilities,• nor had it rendered inade-
quate the resources of the libra.ry or school rooms. 5 Al-
though the_re were isolated inci'dents of failure to provide 
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference 
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs.6 As 
to violence, the court found tha.t the number of acts of vio-
lence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but 
only in proportion to · the increase in population. Respond-
ents failed to produce evidence establishing that · double cell-
ing itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to 
"inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability of-
fered by responclents' expert witness. Finally, the court did 
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates 
· than jobs, had "water[edl down" jobs by assigning more in-
mates to each job than necessary arid by re·ducing the num-
ber of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also 
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists 
' and social workers since "double celling had begun. 
4 The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security 
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. · 434 
F . Supp., at 1014. 
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to in-
mates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access 
to court. As to school. no inmate who was "ready, ·able, and willing to 
receive schooling has been . denied the opportunity",'' although there waS' 
some delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. · Id., at 
. 1015. 
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial 
· backlog of inmates needing routine: dental care, but the: dental staff treated'. 
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District 
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and 
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five 
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms 
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only 
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and over-
crowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more in-
mates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In 
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding neces-
sarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well 
as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid. 
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standa.rds of de-
cency several studies recommending that each person in an 
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters;1 
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square 
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who 
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with 
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac~ 
tice; it is not a temporary condition.0 
7 The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual 
·of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27 
(1977) (60-80 square feet) ; National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail 
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 
§1 (50 square feet) . 
8 The basis of the District Court's assertion as to the amount of time 
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the court's opinion. 
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court found that ·75% of the double celled 
inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their cells from 6:30 a. m. to 
9 p. m. 434 F. Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated that it made thil! 
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate classification, which 
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012. 
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single 
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially 
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate, 
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at 
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each 
·of wnich the court rejected. It then ordered petitioners to reduce tht, 
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must 
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. · The Court of Appeals -disagreed; 
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holdipg only that 
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the 
circumstances at SOCF. ·-It affirmed, without further o,pin-
ion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous, its con·clusions of law were "permissible 
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response 
to the violn,tions found.10 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question to prison administration. - U, S, 
- (1980). We now reverse, 
II 
We consider here for the first · time the limitation that · tp.e 
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Rob-inson v. California, 370 U. S. 
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State· 
may confine those convicted of crimes. · It is unquestioned 
that ''[c]onµnement in a prison ... is a form of punishment 
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards." 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S.-678, 685 (f978); see Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); c[ Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not con-
sidered a disputed contention that the conditions of confine-
ment at a. particular prison constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.11 Nor have we had an ·occasion to consider spe-
-in~ate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population: fell 
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700; App. to Pet. for 
Cert., at A-39. 
10 The Court of Appeals ' stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order 
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F . 2d 1099 (1980). 
11 In _Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison: adminis-
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£ificaUy the principles relevant to assessing claims that con-
ditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We 
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the gen-
eral principles that are relevant to a State's authority to im .. 
pose punishment for criminal conduct. 
A 
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 
tionstitutiqnal limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 
"cruel and unusual." ·The Court has interpreted these words 
uin a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion) , and has extended the 
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punish-
ments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkersot1, 
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 4M 
(1890) . Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punish-
ments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 
supra, at : 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. K 584, 5-92 (1977) 
(plurality opinion) ; Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 34!) 
(1910) .1 2 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of 
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) , the question was 
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel anci' 
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering 
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison 
brutality . . . is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is 
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny.' " Id ., at 669, quoting 1ngraham v. Wright, 525 
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976). . . 
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such. Rooinson v. California, 37& 
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involved" 
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tion." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 u. s. 97, 103 (1976) . 
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine 
. whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for 
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." "Trap V. Dulles, 356 u. S. 86, 101 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that 
"Eighth Amendment judgments shorld neither be nor appear 
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980) . To be sure, "the Con-
stitution contemplates that in the end [a corrt's] own judg-
, ment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182 
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] shou1d be in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum extent possi-
ble.'" Rummel v. Estelle, supra,, at 275, quoting Coker v. 
'Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For examp1e, 
when the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary va1ues, the Court lo0ked 
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of 
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, a,.t 593-
596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib-
·erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and 
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the 
·common hw and state legislatures, that "r a] n inmate must 
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the 
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429' 
U. S., at 103. 
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement 
·comporn the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve 
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they 
be grossly disproportionate to the severity 1of the crime wm-~ 
'~. ' 
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ranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held• 
that the denial of medical care is cruel and unl!sual because, 
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even 
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any peno-
logical purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the 
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted 
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in un-
questioned and serious deprivat:ons of basic hrman needs. 
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or 
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life 's necessities. Such conditions col'ld be cruel· 
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency 
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But 
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under 
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the 
extent that such conditions are restrictive a.nd even harsh, 
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for 
their offenses against society. 
B 
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its con-
clusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one 
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim. 
rrhe double celling made necessary by the increase in prison 
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violenoe 
among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for, 
prison confinement. 434 F. Supp., at 1018. Although job 
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a 
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before 
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary 
and wanton pain ; deprivations of this kind simply are not 
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amend-
ment from its language and history to hold that delay of-
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied 
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. 
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served 
by inmates at SOCF·; the fact that SOCF housed 38% more 
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of 
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 equare 
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled in-
mates spend most of their time in their cells with their cell-
mates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a 
temporary condition. Supra, at -. These general con-
siderations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and 
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double 
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unnecesrnry 
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of crimes warranting imprisonment.18 At most, these con-
eiderations amount to a theory that double celling inflicts 
pain.u Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal 
18 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions 
cf experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contem-
porary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect 
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional 
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in 
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 
l (1980) . Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily 
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude 
toward a given sanction." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint 
opinion) . There was no evidence in this case that double celling is 
viewed generally as violating decency. The cells are smaller than may be 
ideal, but they are exceptionally functional and modern: they are h~ated, 
ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and a sanitary toilet. Each 
cell also has a radio . 434 F . Supp., at 1011. Many p"rs0ns not confined 
in prisons, and not always compelled by poverty, would welcome compar-
able sleeping quarters. 
14 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for 
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and 
violence. In respondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary 
and wanton pain if double celling led to rioting. The dar.ger of prison 
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of 
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious 
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considera-
tions properly are weighed by the legislature and prison ad-
ministration rather than a court. There being no constitu~ 
tional violation,1° the District Court had no authority to con .. 
riots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison au-
thorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to th~ 
conclusirn that double celling at SOCF is cntel and unusual, whatever 
may be the situaticn in a different case. The District Court's finding::; 
of fact lend no support to respondents' claim in this case. Moreover, it 
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the dis-
cretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish. supra. at. 551, and 
n. 32: Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners1 Labor "Union. 433 U. S. 119, 
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. SI17, 827 (1974). 
15 The dissenting opinion states t1iat "the facility described by [the 
Court l is not the one involved 1n tbis case.'' Post, at -. The incor-
rectness of this statement is apparent from an examination of the facts set 
forth at lenf.{th above, see ante, 2-4, and rm. 2--G, and the District Court's 
detailed findings of fact. See 434 F . Supp., at 1009-1018. 
In several instances, the dissent selectively reli ,s on testimony without 
arknowledging that the District Court gave it jittle or no weight. For 
example. the dissent emphasizes the tes·imony of exn°rts as to rsycho-
logiral problems that "may be exp3cted" frcm double celling; it also 
relies on similar testimony as to an increase in tension and !ip.:p.:ression. 
l d., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District 
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and 
physician that "there has been no increase rin violence l other than what 
one would expect from increased numbers [of inmatesl" ld .. at 1018. 
More telli"g is the fact-ignored by the dissevt-that the District Court 
resolved this co!1:fld in the testimony by holding " that there had been 
no incrers"" in Yiolenre or criminal artivity increase due to double crllintt; 
there has been ra.n increasel due to increased population." Ibid. This 
ho!di- g was b:tsed on uncontroverted prison records , required to be 
m'lintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and des~ribed bv the 
Di~tri~t Court as being "detail[edl and b~speakrin!!J credibility." Ibid . 
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court ron-
cerning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required t<l 
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sider whether double celling in light of these considerations 
was the best response to the increase in · Ohio':3 state-wide 
prison population. 
III 
This court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth ( 
Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] de-
cision that a given punishment is impermissible under the 
Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitu-
tional amendment," anti thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in 
the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., 
at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement 
are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their 
inquiries "spring from constitutional requirements and that 
selective findings that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours 
each day, and that others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp., 
at 1013. The dissent fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly 
inconsistent wit):i a prior, twice-repeated, - finding· by the Court that in-
mates "have to be locked in . their cell with their cellmate only from 
around 9 :00 p . m. to 6:30 a. m.," '.id., at 1013," 1012, leaving them free to 
move about for some 14 hottrs. Moreover, it is unquestioned-and also 
not mentioned by the diEsent- that the inmates who spend most of their 
time Jocked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive classification:'' 
These include inmates found guilty of "rule infractions [ after J a plenary 
henring" and inmates who "are there by 'choice' at least to some degree;'' 
lb-id. It must be remembered tbat SOCF is a maximum-security prison, 
housing only persons guilty of violent and other serious crimes. It is 
essential to maintain a regime of close supervision and discipline. 
The dissent also makes mt1ch of the fact that SOCF was housing 38% 
tnore inmates at the time of tr1al tha11 its "rated capacity." According 
to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three factors influence 
priso~ pop{tlation : · the number of arrests, prosecution policies, mid sen-
tencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can change rapidly, 
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to 
calibrate a priso1i's " rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of 
prlson population. Memorandum of the United States as Arnicus Curiae 
3, 6. The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF 
guessed incorrec_tly ·about future prison population, but whether· the actua! 





judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a 
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell 
v. Wol-fi,sh, 441 U. S., at 539.16 
Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel 
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons, 
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplora-
ble" and "sordid." Bell v. WoZ:fish, 441 U. S., at 562. When 
conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect 
constitutional rights." Procun1:er v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. E~-to, 405 U. S. 319, 3-21 (1972) 
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility, 
however, courts cannot assume that state legislakres and 
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Con-
stitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how 
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison 
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974). 
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, 
5 vols. (1980) . It suffices here to repeat: 
"[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, arid, 
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. 
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and "the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within · the pro·vince of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. For all of ·those reasons, 
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems o1 
prison administration and reform. ·· Judicial recognition of · that · fact re-
flects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405 (footnote 
omitted) . 
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S; 119, 125 (1977). 
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population ani! 
administration have been exacerbated by · the increase of serious crime 
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities. 
This case is· illustrative. Ohio · designed and built SOCF in · the early 
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "top-
'flight , first-class facility." Supra, af 2. - -Yet, an unanticipated increa~ 














RHODES v. CHAPMAN 
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the cvimin~l 
justice system: to punish justly, to geter future crime, and 
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
chance of being useful, law~abiding citizens. 
In this case, the question before us is· wpether the condi-
tions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we 
find that they are not, the judgment· of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed. 
l t t is sa ordered. 
~\ 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the housing of two 
inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are 
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), 
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They 
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on 
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at 
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the 
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that 
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was 
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed 
the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respondents: 
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor,· double celling has 
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's state-
wide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have 
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security 
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons: 
has created special problems for the recipient prjsons. Tr. of Oral Arg •. 
2 
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sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offi-
cials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from hous-
ing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary 
nfeasure. 
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about 
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the 
court's own observations during an inspection that it con-
ducted without advance notice. 434 }.,. Supp. 1007 (1977). 
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate popula-
tion, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends 
that these findings are erroneous. 
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620' 
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day 
,rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber 
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field, 
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described 
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class 
facility." Id., at 1009. 
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. 
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-
type night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold 
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from 
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered 
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent 
near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that 
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, 
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the· 
5-6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at 
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979). 
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and was 
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in 
quality and quantity." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court 
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at 
i015. The c'ourt did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify 
them as · a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print: 
shop, sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010. 
,. 
' .. ,. 
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r 
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cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can 
be seen. 
, The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks 
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m. 
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a 
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that 
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each 
day room contains a wall~mounted television, card tables, 
anc;l chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the 
day rooms during a IO-minute period each hour, on the hour, 
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened. 
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that 
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double cell-
ing them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term 
sentences for first-<;legree felonies. Approximately 1,400 in-
mates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the 
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their 
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits, 
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent 
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive 
classification. 8 
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed 
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double 
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food 
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced 
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed 
8 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate 
their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their. 
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and 
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week 
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci-
plinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a wee~ t9 
!tj~d rel~io\\8 s~ices, a :m~v\e! ~r \~~ cp,IJJmiB§llf~~ 
4 
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula-
tion." Id., at 1014. The a,ir ventilation system was ade-
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the 
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the 
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling 
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the 
day rooms or visitation facilities,' nor had it rendered inade-
quate the resources of the library or school rooms.5 Al-
though there were isolated incidents of failure to provide 
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference 
by the SOCF staff to in.mates' medical or dental needs.0 As 
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of vio-
lence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but 
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respond-
ents failed to produce evidence establishing that double cell-
ing itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to 
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability of-
fered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did 
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates 
than jobs, had "water[ed] down" jobs by assigning more in-
mates to each job than necessary and by reducing the num-
ber of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it -also 
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists· 
and social workers since double celling had begun. 
4 The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security 
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434· 
F . Supp., at 1014. 
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even t<f· in-
mates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access 
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to 
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although' tnere was· 
some delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id ., at 
1015. 
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but sll£stanti'al 
backlog of inmates needing routine-' &ntal care, but the dental sta:Jr.·treated' 
emergencies. Id., at 1016: 
' ; 
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District 
Court concluded ·t,hat double celling at SOCF was cruel and 
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five 
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms 
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only 
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and over-
crowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more in-
mates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." !rt 
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding neces-
sarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well 
as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid. 
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standa.rds of de-
cency several studies recommending that each person in an 
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters;'' 
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square· 
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner whO' 
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with 
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac-· 
tice; it is not a temporary condition.9 
7 The District Court cited, e. g. , American Correctional Assn., Manual 
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27' 
(1977) (60-80 square feet) ; National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jaff 
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 
§ 1 ( 50 square feet). 
8 The basis of the District Court's assertion as to the amount of time 
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the court's opinion. 
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court found that 75% of the double celled 
inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their cells from 6:30 a. m. to 
9 p. m. 434 F. Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated that it mane this· 
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate classification, which 
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012. 
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single 
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially 
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate, 
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double ce'fling at · 
SOCF." 434 F. Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five pfans, each 
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sh,th Circuit, 
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must 
be ,read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed'; 
it viewed, the District Court's opinion as holding only that 
double celling is cruel ~ncJ unusual punisp.ment under the 
circumstances at ~OCF. It affirmed, with~ut further o,pin-
ion, on the ground that the Pittrict Cou,:t's ijpdiQJS ·were 
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were ''1parmissibl~ 
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response 
to the violations found.10 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of · the im-
portance of the question to prison administration. - U. S. 
- ( 1980 ). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the 
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendmept, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State 
may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned 
that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment 
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards." 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not con-
sidered a disputed contention that the conditions of confine-
ment at a ' particula.r prison constituted cruel and unusual 
punii;hment.11 Not have we had an occasion to consider spe-
inmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell 
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for 
Cert., at A- 39. 
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order 
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980) . 
11 Irr Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978) , the state prison admin1s .. 
t rato'rs 'clid not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the condition~ 
' ~-
80-332-0PINION 
RHODES v. CHAPMAN 
~ificl}Jly the pr.incipies relevant to assessing claims that con-
tiitions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We 
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents f~r- the gen-
eral principles that are relevant to a State's authtwity to im-
pose punishmeJlt for, ~riminal conduct. 
A 
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words 
''in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the 
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punish-
ments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 
(1890) . Today the · Eighth · Amendment prohibits punish-
ments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 
supra, at 173, or are grossly · disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U, S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 
(1910) .12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of 
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was 
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted pruel and 
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering 
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison 
brutality . . . is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is 
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976). 
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such. Robi™on v. California, 3'10 
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is no~ involvetl 
in this case. 
' •: 
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tion." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gambl6, 
429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976). 
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine 
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for 
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that 
"Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear 
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Con-
stitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182 
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] should be .in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum extent po~i-
ble.'" Rummel v. Estelle, supra, at 275, quoting Coker. v. 
Georgia,, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion) . For example, 
when the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked 
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of 
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra, at 176- 187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593-
596 Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib-
erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and 
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the 
common law and state legislatures, that "raJn inmate must 
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the 
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429 
U. S., at 103. 
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement 
compm:e the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve 
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they 
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime war-
80-332-0PINION 
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ranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, S'W(>-11®, we held 
that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because, 
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even 
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any peno-
logical purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the 
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in un-
questioned and serious deprivat:ons of basic human needs. 
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or 
in co~bination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cl'Uel 
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency 
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103- 104. :But 
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under 
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the 
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, 
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for 
their o:ff enses against society. 
B 
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its con-
clusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one 
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim. 
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated in- , 
crease in prison population did not lead to deprivations of' 
essential food, medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase 
viole11ce among inmates or create other conditions intolerable 
for prison confinemeut. 434 F. Supp. , at 1018. Although job 
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a 
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before 
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary 
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not 
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amend:. 
ment from its language and history to hold that delay of' 
tihe!e de.sirable aids t-o rehabilitation violates the Omstitution-,. 
rn 
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied 
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. 
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served 
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more 
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of 
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 Equare 
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled in-
mates spend most of their time in their cells with their cell-
mates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a 
temporary condition . . Supra, at -. These general con-
siderations fall far sh~rt in themselves of proving cruel and 
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double 
celling under these c'ircumstances either inflicts unnecesrnry 
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of crimes w~.rranting · imprisonment.13 At most, these con-
siderations amount to a theory that double celling ·inflicts 
pain.14 Perhaps they ·reflect an aspiration toward an ideal 
13 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions 
of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contem-
porary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect 
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional 
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in 
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 
I (1980). 'Indeed, generalize<l opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily 
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude 
toward a given sanction." 'Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint 
opinion) . We could agree that double celling i,; not de;,irable, ei:ipeeially 
in view of the size of these cells. But there is no evidence in thii:i ea,;e 
that doublt' celling is viewed generally as violating decency. Moreover, 
though small, the cells in SOCF are t:>.xceptionally modern and functional; 
they are heated, ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and a 
/!Sanitary toliet. Each cell also has a radio. 4:,4 F . Supp., at 1011. 
14 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for 
· long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and 
violence. In re_sp~ndents' view,_ it )VOUld b~ ~n infliction of unneces~ary 
·apd ·wanton pam 1f double cellmg 1ed to r1otmg. The danger of prison 
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of 
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious 
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considera-
tions properly are weighed by the legislature and prison ad-
ministration rather than a court. There being no constitu-
tional violation,15 the District Court had no authority to con-
thorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the 
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual, whatever 
may be the situation in a different case. The District Court's findings 
of fact, lend no support to respondents' claim in this case. Moreover, a 
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the dis-
cretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 551, and 
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). 
15 The dissenting opinion states that "the facility described by [the 
Court] is not the one involved in this case." Post, at -. The incor-
rectness of this statement is apparent from an examination of the facts set 
forth at, length above, see ante, 2-4, and nn. 2- 6, and the District Court's 
detailed findings of fact . See 434 F. Supp., · at 1009-1018. 
In several instances, the dissent selectively relies on testimony without 
acknowledging that the District Court gave it little or no weight. For 
example, the dissent emphasizes the testimony of experts as to psycho-
logical problems that "may be expected" from double celling; it also 
relies on similar testim~ny as to an increase in tension and aggression. 
Id ., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District 
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and 
physician that "there has been no increase [in violence] other than what 
one would expect from increased numbers [of inmates]." Id., at 1018. 
More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-that the District Court 
resolved this conflict in the testimony by holding "that there had been 
no increase in violence or criminal activity increase due to double celling; 
there has been [an increase] due to increased population." Ibid. This 
holding was based on uncontroverted prison records, required to be 
maintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and described by the 
District Court as being "detail[edl and bespeak[ing] credibility." Ibid. 
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court con-
cerning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required to 






sider whether double celling in light of these consideratiQns 
was the best response to the increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population, 
III 
This court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth 
Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] de-
cision that a given punishment is impermissible under the 
Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitu-
tional amendment," and thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in 
the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georg,ia, 428 U. S., 
at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement 
are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their 
inquiries "spring from constitutional requirements and that 
selective findings that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours 
each day, and that others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp., 
at 1013. The dissent fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly 
inconsistent with a prior, twice-repeated, 'finding by the Court that in-
mates "have to be locked in their cell with their cellmate .only frorri 
around 9:00 p. m. to 6:30 a. m.," id., at 1013, 1012, leaving them free to 
move about for some 14 hours. Moreover; it is unquestioned-and also 
not mentioned by the dissent-that the inmates who spend most of their 
time locked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive classification." 
These include inmates found guilty of "rule infractions [after} a plenary 
hearing" and inmates wl1() "are there by 'choice' at least to some degree." 
Ibid. It must be remembered tha.t SOCF is a maximum-security prison, 
housing only persons guilty of violent and other serious crimes. It is 
essential to maintain a regime of close supervision and discipline. 
The dissent also makes much of the fact that SOCF was housing 38% 
more inmates at the time of trial than its "rated capacity." According 
to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three factors infiuence 
prison population: the number of arrests, prosecution policies, and sen-
tencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can change rapidly, 
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to 
calibrate a prison's "rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of 
prison population. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
3, 6. The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF 
guessed incorrectly about future prison population, but whether the actual 
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judicial anewere to them must reflect that fact rather than a 
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539.10 
Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel 
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons, 
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deploi'a-' 
ble" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562. When 
conditions of confinement amount to cruel a.nd unusual pun-
ishment, "federal courts will discha.rge their duty to protect 
constitutional rights." Procun-ier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) 
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility, 
however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and 
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Con-
stitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how 
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison 
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974). 
See generally, Na.tional Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, 
5 vols. (1980). It suffices here to repeat: 
"rTJhe problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, 
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. 
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, 
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of 
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact re-
flects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405 (footnote 
omitted). 
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977). 
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and 
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime 
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities. 
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early 
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "top-
flight, first-class facility.'' Supra, at 2. Yet, an unanticipated increase-
in the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at 
i:;sue, 
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best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal 
justice system: t.o punish justly, to deter future crime, and 
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens. 
In this case, the question before us is whether the condi~ 
tions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we 
find that they :are not, .the judgment of the Court of Appeais 
is reversed. 
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From: llr . Justice Brennan 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment. Circulated : 
J\11 1 ., 
Today's decision reaffirms that "[c]ourts do haJ~e1cl'oulat ed : _____ _ 
responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual 
confinement." Ante, at 12. With that I agree. I also agree 
that the District Court's findings in this case do not support a 
judgment that the practice of double-celling in the Southern Ohio 
Correctional Facility is in violation of the Eighth Amendment. I 
write separately, however, to emphasize that today's decision 
should in no way be construed as a retreat from careful judicial 
scrutiny of prison conditions, and to discuss the factors courts 
should consider in undertaking such scrutiny. 
I 
Although this Court has never before considered what prison 
conditions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see ante, at 6, such questions 
have been addressed recurringly by the lower courts. In fact, 
individual prisons or entire prison systems in at least 23 States 
have been declared unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment,l 
1Among the States in which prisons or prison systems have 
been placed under court order because of conditions of 
con~inement in violation of the Eighth Amendment are: Alabama, 
see Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as 
modified, 559 F.2d 283 (CA5 1977), rev'd in part of other 





___ : Arkansas, see Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720 
~~~ ...... 4t ~~AA.L.C~~ 
11.-(_~~~"16'u..-v~ 
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with litigation underway in many others.2 Thus, the lower courts 
have learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience 
that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional 
dictates--not to mention considerations of basic humanity--are to 
be observed in the prisons. 
No one familiar with litigation in this area could suggest 
that the courts have been overeager to usurp the task of running 
prisons, which, as the Court today properly notes, is entrusted 
in the first instance to "the legislature and prison 
/ /~ 
(E.D. Ark. 1978): Colorado, see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (CA 
10 1980), cert. denied, U.S. (1981): Delaware, see 
Anderson v. Redman, 429 ~Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977): Florida, 
see Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), 
aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (CA5), vacated on rehearing on other 
grounds, 539 F.2d. 547 (CA5 1976) (en bane), rev'd, 430 U.S. 325, 
aff'd on remand, 553 F.2d 506 (CA5 1977) (en bane) (per curiam): 
Georgia, see Guthrie v. Evans, (S.D. Ga.): Illinois, see 
Light f 00 t v . W a 1 k er , 4 8 6 F . Su pp -:---SO 4 S . D . I 11 . 19 8 0) ( S . D . I 11 . 
, 1980): Kentucky, see Kendrick v. Carroll, __ (W.D. Ky. __ ), and 
\Thompson v. Bland, (1980): Louisiana, see Williams v. 
~awards, 547 F.2d 1206 (CA 5 1977): Maryland, see Johnson v. 
Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 
1378 (CA4 1978), and Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 ( D. Md. 
~1978), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (CA4 1978): Mississippi, see 
Gates v. Collier, 501 F. 2d 1291 (CA 5 1974): Missouri, see Burks 
v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979): New Hampshire, see 
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977): New York, 
see Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (CA2 1977): Ohio, see (in 
addition to this case) Stewart v. Rhodes, (S.D. Ohio): 
Oklahoma, see Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d~8 (CA 10 1977): 
Oregon, see Capps v. At~ykh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1980): 
Pennsylvania, see Hendrie v. Jackson, 309 A.2d 187 (1973): Rhode 
Island, see Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 433 F. Supp. 956 (D. R.I. 
1977), remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (CAl 1977): Tennessee, see Trigg v. 
Blanton, (state court): Texas, see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. 
Supp. 1265(5.D. Tex. 1980): Wyoming, Bustos v. Herschler (D. 
Wyo. ) . See also Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14 (D. 
P.~. 1980): Barnes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F. 
Su pp • 1218 ( D • V • I • 19 7 6 ) • 
2There are over 8,000 pending cases filed by inmates 
challenging prison conditions. National Institute of Justice, 
American Prisons and Jails, Vol. III (1980), at 34. 
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administration rather than a court." Ante, at 11. And 
certainly, no one could suppose that the courts have ordered 
prisons," ibid., on the model of 
To the contrary, "the soul-chilling inhumanity 
American prisons has been thrust upon the 
judicial conscience." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. 
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. Mass. 1973). 
Judicial opinions in this area do not make pleasant 
/ 
reading.3 For example, in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. 
Ala. 1976), Judge Frank Johnson described in gruesome detail the 
conditions then prevailing in the Alabama penal system. The 
institutions were "horrendously overcrowded," id., at 322, to the 
point where some inmates were forced to sleep on mattresses 
spread on floors in hallways and next to urinals. Id., at 323. 
The physical facilities were "dilapidated" and "filthy," the 
3It behooves us to remember that 
"it is impossible for a written opinion to convey the 
pernicious conditions and the pain and degradation 
which ordinary inmates suffer within 
[unconstitutionally operated prisons]--gruesome 
experiences of youthful first offenders forcibly raped; 
the cruel and justifiable fears of inmates, wondering 
when they will be called upon to defend the next 
violent assault; the sheer misery, the discomfort, the 
wholesale loss of privacy for prisoners housed with 
one, two, or three others in a forty-five foot cell or 
suffocatingly packed together in a crowded dormitory; 
the physical suffering and wretched psychological 
stress which must be endured by those sick or injured 
who cannot obtain medical care ••.. For those who are 
incarcerated within [such prisons], these conditions 
and experiences form the content and essence of daily 
existence." Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391 
(S.D. Tex. 1980). 
-4-
cells infested with roaches, flies, mosquitoes, and other vermin. 
Ibid. Sanitation facilities were limited and in ill repair, 
emitting an "overpowering odor": in one instance over 200 men 
were forced to share one toilet. Ibid. Inmates were not 
provided with toothpaste, toothbrushes, shampoo, shaving cream, 
razors, combs, or other such necessities. Ibid. Food was 
"unappetizing and unwholesome," poorly prepared and often 
infested with insects, and served without reasonable utensils. 
Ibid. There were no meaningful vocational, educational, 
recreational or work programs. Id., at 326. A United States 
health officer described the prisons as "wholly unfit for human 
habitation according to virtually every criterion used for 
evaluation by public health inspectors." Id., at 323-324. 
Perhaps the worst of all was the "rampant violence" within the 
prison. Id., at 325. Weaker inmates were "repeatedly 
victimized" by the stronger: robbery, rape, extortion, theft and 
assault were "everyday occurrences among the general inmate 
population." Id., at 324. Faced with this record, the court-- ~ 
not surprisingly--found that the conditions of confinement 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and issued a 
comprehensive remedial order affecting virtually every aspect of 
prison administration.4 
Unfortunately, the Alabama example is neither abberational 
nor anachronistic. Last year, in Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (CA 
4This Court has upheld the exercise of wide discretion by 
trial courts to correct conditions of confinement found to be 
unconstitutional. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-688 (1978). 
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10 1980), cert. denied, U.S. (1981), for example, the 
Tenth Circuit declared conditions in the maximum security unit of 
the Colorado State Penitentiary at Canon City unconstitutional. 
The living areas of the prison were "unfit for human habitation," 
id., at 567; the food unsanitary and "grossly inadequate," id., 
at 570; the institution "fraught with tension and violence," 
often leading to injury and death, id., at 572; the health care 
"blatant[ly] inadequat[e]" and "appalling," id., at 574; and 
various restrictions of prisoners' rights to visitation, mail, 
and access to courts in violation of basic constitutional rights, 
id., at 578-585. Similar tales of horror are recounted in dozens 
of other cases. See,~, cases cited in note 1 supra. 
Overcrowding and cramped living conditions are particularly 
pressing problems in many prisons. Out of 82 court orders in 
effect concerning conditions of confinement in federal and state 
correctional facilities as of March 31, 1978, 26 involved the 
issue of overcrowding. National Institute of Justice, American 
Prisons and Jails, Vol. III, at 32 (1980). Two-thirds of all 
inmates in federal, state, and local correctional facilities were 
confined in cells or dormitories providing less than 60 square 
feet per person--the minimal standard deemed acceptable by the 
American Public Health Association, the Justice Department, and 
other authorities.5 
5see American Public Health Association, Standards for 
HeAlth Services in Correctional Institutions 62 (1976); 
Department of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 17 
(1980); see generally National Institute of Justice, American 
Prisons and Jails, Vol. III, at 59-60 & n.6. 
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The problems of administering prisons within constitutional 
standards are indeed "complex and intractable," ante, at 13, 
n.16, quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974), 
but at their core is a lack of resources allocated to prisons. ~ 
Confinement of prisoners is unquestionably an expensive 
proposition: the average direct current expenditure at adult 
institutions in 1977 was $5,461 per inmate, National Institute of 
Justice, American Prisons and Jails, Vol. II, at 115 (1980): the 
average cost of constructing space for an additional prisoner is 
estimated at $25,000 to $50,000. Id., at 119. Oftentimes, 
funding for prisons has been dramatically below that required to 
comply with basic consitutional standards. For example, to bring 
the Louisiana prison system into compliance required a 
supplemental appropriation of $18,431,622 for a single year's 
operating expenditures, and of $105,605,000 for capital outlays. 
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1219-1221 (CA5 1977) (Exhibit 
A) • 
Over the last decade, correctional resources, never ample, 
have lagged behind burgeoning prison populations. In Ruiz v. 
Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), for example, the 
court stated that an "unprecedented upsurge" in the number of 
inmates has "undercut any realistic expectation" of eliminating 
double- and triple-celling, despite construction of a new 
$43,000,000 unit. Id., at 1280-1281. The number of inmates in 
federal and state correctional facilities has risen 42% since 
1975, and last year grew at its fastest rate in three years. 
Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 Corrections 16, 16-17 (1981) (report 
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of annual survey of prison populations) .6 A major infusion of 
money would be required merely to keep pace with prison 
populations. 
Public apathy and the political powerlessness of inmates 
have contributed to the pervasive neglect of the prisons. Chief 
Judge Henley observed that the people of Arkansas "knew little or 
nothing about their penal system" prior to the Holt litigation, 
despite "sporadic and sensational 'exposes.'" Holt v. Sarver, 
309 F. Supp. 362, 367 (E.D. Ark. 1970). Prison inmates are 
"voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening." 
Morris, The Snail's Pace of Prison Reform, Proceedings of the 
100th Annual Congress of Corrections 36, 42 (1970). Thus, the 
suffering of prisoners, even if known, generally "moves the 
community in only the most severe and exceptional cases." Ibid. 
As a result even conscientious prison officials are "[c]aught in 
the middle," as state legislatures refuse "to spend sufficient 
tax dollars to bring conditions in outdated prisons up to 
minimally acceptable standards." Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 
648, 654 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (CA4 1978) .7 
~ 
6Among the causes of· < rising number of prison inmates 
are increasing populationf ~~creasing crime rates, stiffer 
sentencing provisions, and more restrictive parole practices. 
See Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 Corrections 16, 17 (1981); 
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, The 
National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System, Vol. 
III, at 13-14 (1978). 
7Moreover, part of the problem in some instances is the 
attitude of politicians and officials. Of course, the courts 
should not "assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution," ante, 
at 13 (emphasis added), but sad experience has shown that 
sometimes they can in fact be insensitive to such requirements. 
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After extensive exposure to this process, Judge Pettine came to 
view the "barbaric physical conditions" of Rhode Island's prison 
system as "the ugly and shocking outward manifestations of a 
deeper dysfunction, an attitude of cynicism, hopelessness, 
predatory selfishness, and callous indifference that appears to 
infect, to one degree or another, almost everyone who comes in 
contact with the [prison]." Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 
956, 984 (D. R.I. 1977), remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (CAl 1979). 
Under these circumstances, the courts have emerged as a ------ -- --
critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions. 
Insulated as they are from political pressures, and charged with 
the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the 
strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be 
remedied, even at significant financial cost. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, 
See Civil Rights of the Institutionalized, Hearings on S. 10 
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979) 
(testimony of Asst. Attorney General Drew Days); Palmigiano v. 
Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 671 (D. R.I. 1978) (prison officials 
failed to implement court order for reasons unrelated to ability 
to comply). William P. Nagel, a New Jersey corrections official 
for 11 years and now a frequent expert witness in prison 
litigation, testified in 1977 that, in every one of the 17 
lawsuits in which he had participated, the government officials 
worked in a "systematic way" to "impede the fulfillment of 
constitutionality within our institutions." Civil Rights of the 
Institutionalized, Hearings on S. 1393 Before the Subcommittee on 
the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 772 (1977). He stated that he had "learned 
through experience that most states resist correcting their 
unconstitutional conditions or operations until pressed to do so 
by threat of a suit or by directive from the judiciary." Id., at 
779. Indeed, this Court recognized the problem of obstructionist 
official behavior when it affirmed an award of attorney's fees 
against Arkansas prison officials who had failed to comply with a 
court order, on the ground that the litigation had been conducted 
in bad faith. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689-693 (1978). 
-9-
then serving on the Court of Appeals, set the tone in Jackson v. 
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (CAB 1968): "Humane considerations and 
constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured 
or limited by dollar considerations " 
Progress toward constitutional conditions of confinement in 
the nation's prisons has been slow and uneven, despite judicial 
pressure. Nevertheless, it is clear that judicial intervention --------.. 
not only for remedying some of the worst 
abuses by direct order, but for "forcing the legislative branch 
of government to reevaluate correctional policies and to 
appropriate funds for upgrading penal systems." National 
Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, Vol. III), at 
163. A detailed study of four prison conditions cases by the 
American Bar Association concluded: 
"The judicial intervention in each of the 
correctional law cases studied had impact that was 
broad and substantial .... For the most part, the impact 
of the judicial intervention was clearly beneficial to 
the institutions, the correctional systems, and the 
broader community. Dire consequences predicted by some 
correctional personnel did not accompany the judicial 
intervention in the cases studied. Inmates were 
granted greater rights and protections, but the 
litigation did not undermine staff authority and 
control. Institutional conditions improved, but 
facilities were not turned into 'country clubs.' The 
courts intervened in correctional affairs, but the 
judges did not take over administration of the 
facilities." M. Harris & D. Spiller, After Decision: 
Implementation of Judicial Decrees in Correctional 
Settings 21 (1977). 
Even prison officials have acknowledged that judicial 
intervention has helped them to obtain support for needed reform. 
Comptroller General, Report to Congress: The Department of 
Justice Can Do More to Help Improve Conditions at State and Local 
-10-
Correctional Facilities 12-13 (1980). The Commissioner of 
Corrections of New York City, a defendant in many lawsuits 
challenging jail and prison conditions, has stated: "Federal 
courts may be the last resort for us .•.. If there's going to be 
change, I think the federal courts are going to have to force 
cities and states to spend more money on their prisons ...• I 
look on the courts as a friend." Gettinger, "Cruel and Unusual" 
Prisons, 3 Corrections 3, 5 (1977). In a similar vein, the 
Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, 
testified before a Congressional committee that lawsuits brought 
on behalf of prison inmates 
"have upgraded correctional institutions and the 
development of procedural safeguards regarding basic 
constitutional rights. There is no question in my mind 
that had such court intervention not taken place, these 
fundamental improvements would not have occurred. 
* * * 
"While I do not intend to imply here that I sit 
expectantly at my desk each week awaiting news of 
another impending suit, I do recognize that unless my 
agency consistently deals fairly with those 
incarcerated in our institutions we will be held 
judicially accountable." Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons, Hearings on S. 1393 Before 
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 409-
410 (1977) (testimony of Kenneth Schoen) .8 
8After extensive hearings concerning the effect of court 
litigation on the correction of unconstitutional conditions in 
state-operated institutions, Congress emphatically endorsed the 
role of the courts in the area by passing the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 346, 
which authorized the Attorney General to bring suits in federal 
court on behalf of persons institutionalized by the States under 
unconstitutional conditions. The Conference Committee noted 
thqt, as a result of litigation in which the Justice Department 
had participated, 
"conditions have improved significantly in dozens of 
institutions across the Nation: barbaric treatment 




The task of the courts in cases challenging prison \ 
conditions is to "determine whether a challenged punishmen't 
comports with human dignity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
282 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Such determinations are 
necessarily imprecise and indefinite, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 100 (1958): Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-136 (1879): 
they require careful scrutiny of challenged conditions, and 
application of realistic yet humane standards. 
In performing this responsibility, this Court and the lower 
? 
I 
courts have been especially deferential to prison authorities "in 
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in 
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 
discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979): see also ante, at 13, n.16: 
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 
(1977): Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). Many conditions 
of confinement, however, including overcrowding, poor sanitation, 
and inadequate safety precautions, arise from neglect rather than 
and States facing the prospect of suit by the Attorney 
General have voluntarily upgraded conditions in their 
institutions ••• to comply with previously announced 
constitutional standards." H.R. Rep. No. 897, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980). 
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motivation to operate prisons within limits of decency. Courts 
must and do recognize the primacy of the legislative and 
executive authorities in the administration of prisons; however, 
if the prison authorities do not conform to constitutional 
minima, the courts are under an obligation to take steps to 
remedy the violations. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 
(1973). 9 
The first aspect of judicial decisionmaking in this area is 
scrutiny of the actual conditions under challenge. It is 
important to recognize that various deficiencies in prison 
conditions "must be considered together." Holt v. Sarver, supra, 
at 373. The individual conditions "exist in combination; each 
affects the other; and taken together they [may] have a 
cumulative impact on the inmates." Ibid. Thus, a court 
considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of 
confinement must examine the totality of the circumstances.10 
9see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 u.s. 319, 321 (1972): 
"Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to 
enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' 
including prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison 
officials must be accorded latitude in the 
administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners 
necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and 
regulations. But persons in prisons, like other 
individuals, have the right to petition the Government 
for redress of grievances which, of course, includes 
'access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of 
presenting their complaints.'" (Ci tat ions omitted.) 
lOThe Court today adopts the totality of the circumstances 
test. See ante, at 9 (Prison conditions "alone or in 
combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure 
of life's necessities.") (emphasis added). See also Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) ("We find no error in the 
court's conclusion that, taken as a whole, conditions in the 
-13-
Even if no single condition of confinement would be 
unconstitutional in itself, "exposure to the cumulative effect of 
prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual 
punishment." Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-323 (D. 
N.H. 1977). 
Moreover, in seeking relevant information about conditions 
in a prison, the court must be open to evidence and assistance 
from many sources, including expert testimony and studies on the 
effect of particular conditions on prisoners. For this purpose, 
public health, medical, psychiatric, psychological, penological, 
architectural, structural, and other experts have proven useful 
to the lower courts in observing and interpreting prison 
conditions. See,~, Palmigiano v. Garrahy, supra, 443 F. 
Supp., at 960 (commenting that the Court's "task was made easier 
by the extensive assistance of experts") .11 
More elusive, perhaps, is the second aspect of the judicial 
inquiry: application of realistic yet humane standards to the 
conditions as observed. Courts have expressed these standards in 
various ways, see,~, M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 
F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Mass. 1978) ("contemporary standards of 
decency"): Palmigiano v. Garrahy, supra, 443 F. Supp., at 979 
(conditions so bad as to "shock the conscience of any reasonable 
isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.") (emphasis added) • 
111 do not understand the Court's opinion to disparage use 
of'experts to assist the courts in these functions. Indeed, the 
Court acknowledges that expert opinion may be "helpful and 
relevant" in some circumstances. Ante, at 10, n.13. 
-14-
citizen"): Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) {quoting 
Jackson v. Bishop, supra, 404 F.2d, at 579) {"broad and 
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, 
and decency"). Each of these descriptions has its merit, but in 
the end, the court attempting to apply them is left to rely upon 
its own experience and on its knowledge of contemporary 
standards.12 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) 
{plurality opinion): Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) 
{joint opinioin). 
In determining when prison conditions pass beyond legitimate 
punishment and become cruel and unusual, the "touchstone is the 
effect upon the imprisoned." Laaman v. Helgemoe, supra, 437 F. 
Supp., at 323. The court must examine the effect upon the 
inmates of the condition of the physical plant {lighting, hea , 
plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise levels, recreation 
space): sanitation {control of vermin and insects, food 
preparation, medical facilities, lavatories and showers, 
places for eating, sleeping, and working,): safety {protection 
from violent, deranged, or diseased inmates, fire protection, 
emergency evacuation): inmate needs and services {clothing, 
12Again, the assistance of experts can be of great value to 
courts when evaluating standards for confinement. Although 
expert testimony alone does not "suffice to establish 
contemporary standards of decency," ante, at 10, n.13, such 
testimony can help the courts to understand the prevailing norms 
against which conditions in a particular prison may be evaluated. 
In this connection, the work of standard-setting organizations 
such as the Department of Justice, the American Public Health 
Association, the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, and 
the National Sheriffs' Association is particularly valuable. 
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nutrition, bedding, medical, dental, and mental health care, 
visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and 
rehabilitative programming): and staffing (trained and adequate 
guards and other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions 
of authority over other inmates). See ibid.: Ramos v. Lamm, 
supra, 639 F.2d, at 567-581. When "the cumulative impact of the 
conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental, and 
emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a 
probability of recidivism and future incarceration," the court 
must conclude that the conditions violate the Constitution. 
Laaman v. Helgemoe, supra, at 323. 
III 
A reviewing court is generally limited in its perception of 
a case to the findings of the trial court. I have not seen the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, nor have I 
directly heard evidence concerning conditions there. From the 
district court opinion, I know that the prison is a modern, "top-
flight, first-class facility," built in the early 1970s at a cost 
of some $32 million, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Ohio, 1977). 
Judge Hogan, who toured the facility, described it as "not 
lacking in color," and, "generally speaking, .•• quite light and 
airy, etc." Id., at 1011. The cells are reasonably well-
furnished, with one cabinet-type night stand, one wall cabinet, 
one wall shelf, one wall mounted lavatory with hot and cold 
• 
running water and steel mirror, one china commode flushed from 
inside the cell, one wall mounted radio, one heating and air 
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circulation vent, one lighting fixture, and one bed. Id., at 
1011. Prisoners in each cell block have frequent access to a day 
room, which is "in a sense part of the cells," and is "designed 
to furnish that type of recreation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Food is 
"adequate in every respect," and the kitchens and dining rooms 
are clean. Id., at 1014. Prisoners are all permitted contact 
visitation. Ibid. The ratio of inmates to guards is "well 
within the acceptable ratio," and incidents of violence, while 
not uncommon, have not increased out of proportion to inmate 
population. Id., at 1014-1015, 1016-1018. Plumbing and lighting 
are adequate. Id., at 1014. The prison has a modern, well-
stocked library, with an adequate law library. Id., at 1010, 
1010, n.2. It has eight schoolrooms, two chapels, a commissary, 
a barber shop, dining rooms, kitchens, and workshops. Ibid. 
Virtually the only serious complaint of the inmates at the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is that 1,280 of the 1,620 
cells are used to house two inmates. 
I have not the slightest doubt that 63 square feet of cell 
space is not enough for two men. I understand that every major 
study of living space in prisons has so concluded. See 434 F. 
Supp., at 1021: see also supra, at note : post, at __ 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting)~ That prisoners are housed under such 
conditions is an unmistakeable signal to the legislators and 
officials of Ohio: either more prison facilities should be built 
or expanded, or fewer persons should be incarcerated in prisons. 
Even so, the findings of the District Court do not support a 
-17-
conclusion that the conditions at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility--cramped though they are--constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. See Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 673-674 (CA 4 
1977); M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, supra, 447 F. Supp., 
at 404-405.13 
The "touchstone" of the Eighth Amendment inquiry is "the 
effect upon the imprisoned." Supra, at __ , quoting Laaman v. 
Helgemoe, supra, 437 F. Supp., at 323. The findings of the 
District Court leave no doubt that the prisoners are adequately 
sheltered, fed, and protected, and that opportunities for 
education, work, and rehabilitative assistance are available.14 
One need only compare the District Court's description of 
13The District Court rested its judgment on five 
considerations: (1) the long-term confinement of the prisoners, 
(2) the rated capacity of the prison, (3) expert opinion of 
living space requirements, (4) time spent in the cells, and (5) 
the permanent character of the double-celling. This led the 
Court of Appeals to conclude that the District Court had not 
ruled the practice of double-celling "unconstitutional under all 
circumstances." App. to Pet. for Cert., at A-2 (CA6, 1980). The 
five considerations cited by the District Court, in my view, are 
not ?eparate aspects of conditions at the prison; rather, they 
merely embroider upon the theme that double-celling is 
unconstitutional in itself. 
14The overcrowding in the cells is mitigated considerably 
by the freedom of most prisoners to spend time away from their 
cells, especially in the day rooms. The inhabitants of 960 of 
the double-occupant cells were out of the cells some ten hours a 
day at school, work, or other activities. 434 F. Supp., at 1013. 
Of the remainder, all of whom spent six or fewer hours a week out 
of the cells, some were on short-term "receiving status," some on 
semi-protected status by choice, and some on "idle" status by 
choice. Ibid. The remainder were in administrative isolation 
because of infractions of the rules, determined after a plenary 
hearing. Ibid. 
• During trial in this case, and before final judgment by the 
District Court, the prison implemented a plan limiting double-
celling to those inmates free to move about the facility 15 hours 
per day. Brief for Petitioner, at 27. 
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conditions at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility with 
descriptions of other major State and federal facilities, see 
supra, at __ , to realize that this prison, crowded though it is, 
is one of the better, more humane large prisons in the nation.15 
The consequence of the District Court's order might well be 
to make life worse for many Ohio inmates, at least in the short 
run. As a result of the order, some prisoners have been 
transferred to the Columbus Correctional Facility, a 
deteriorating facility nearly 150 years old, itself the subject 
of litigation over conditions of confinement and under a 
preliminary order enjoining racially segregative and punitive 
practices. See Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. Ohio, 
1979). 
The District Court may well be correct in the abstract that 
prison overcrowding and double-celling such as existed at the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility generally results in serious 
harm to the inmates. But cases are not decided in the abstract. 
A court is under the obligation to examine the actual effect of 
challenged conditions upon the wellbeing of the prisoners.16 The 
District Court in this case was unable to identify any actual 
15rf it were true that any prison providing less than 63 
square feet of cell space per inmate were a per se violation of 
the Eighth Amendment, then approximately two-thirds of all 
federal, state, and local inmates today would be 
unconstitutionally confined. See supra, at __ 
16This is not to sar that injury to the inmates from 
challenged prison conditions must be "demonstrate[d] with a high 
degree of specificity and certainty." Ruiz v. Estelle, supra 
note 1, at 1286. Courts may, as usual, employ common sense, 
observation, expert testimony, and other practical modes of 
proof. See id., at 1286-1287. 
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signs that the double-celling at the Southern Ohio Correctional 
has seriously harmed the inmates there;l7 indeed, the Court's 
findings of fact suggest that crowding at the prison has not 
reached the point of causing serious injury. Since I cannot 
conclude that the totality of conditions at the facility offends 
constitutional norms, and am of the view that double-celling in 
itself is not per se impermissible, I concur in the judgment of 
the Court. 
17cf. Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810-814 (D. Ore. 
1980) (evidence "replete with examples of the deleterious effects 
of overcrowding on prisoners' mental and physical health," 
including increased health risks, diminished access to essential 
services, fewer opportunities to engage in rehabilitative 
programs, levels of privacy and quiet insufficient for 
psychological wellbeing, and exacerbated levels of tension, 
anxiety, and fear); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112-
1118 (D. Del. 1977) (court found that overcrowding had caused 
severe physical and psychological damage to inmates, increased 
the incidence of self-mutilation, suicide, attempted suicide, 
th~ft, assault, and homosexual rape, destroyed all privacy, 
overtaxed the sanitary facilities, exacerbated the problems of 
filth, noise, and vermin, caused serious deterioration in medical 
care, fostered increased idleness, broke down the classification 
and incentive systems, and demoralized the staff). 
6-2-81 
6.th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA.DI 
No. 80-332 
· James A. Rhodes et al.,! . . . h . d 
Petitioners On Writ of Certiorari to t e Umte 
' States Court of Appeals for the 
K 11 Ch 
v. al Sixth Circuit. 
e y apman et . 
[April -, 1981] 
JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether the housing of two 
ihmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctionai 
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are 
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), 
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. ·Tliey' 
were housed in ·the same cell when they brought this action 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on 
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at 
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the 
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that 
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was 
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed· 
the prison's facilities and stafI.1 As relief, respondents 
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has 
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's state-
wide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have-' 
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security 
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons-
has created special problems for · tlie recipient prisons. Tr. of Oral Arg .. 
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sought an in.iunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offl .. 
eials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from hous-
ing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary 
measure. 
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about 
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the 
tourt's own observations during an inspection that it con-
ducted without advance notice. 434 }~. Supp. 1007 (1977). 
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate popula-
tion, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends 
that these findings are erroneous. 
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620 
Mlls, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day 
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber 
11hop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field, 
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described 
this physical plant as "'1nquestionably a top-flight, first-class 
facility." Id., at 1009. 
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. 
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-
type night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold 
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from 
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered 
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent 
nea.r the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that 
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet, 
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the 
~- Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at 
BOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979). 
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and waS 
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in 
quality and quantity." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court 
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id ., at 
.1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify-
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print 
shop, sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010. 
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~ells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can 
be seen. 
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks 
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m. 
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a 
eense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that 
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen 
would seek in his living ·room or den." Id., at 1012. Each 
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables, 
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the-
day rooms during a IO-minute period each hour, on the hour, 
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened. 
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that 
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double cell-
ing them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide· 
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300· 
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term 
eentences for first-degree _ felonies. Approximately 1,400 in-
mates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the 
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their 
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits, 
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent 
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive 
classification. 3 
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed 
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double 
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food · 
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced 
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed 
a Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate 
'their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their · 
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and 
newly arrived inmates awaiting · classification had only 4 hours a week 
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci-
plinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week to,. 
•tt~nd · religious services, a mwi'e, "or the commissary. 
4 
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula-
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade-
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the 
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the 
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling 
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the 
day rooms or visitation facilities/ nor had it rendered inade-
quate the resources of the libra.ry or school r~oms.~ Al-
though there were isolated incidents of failure to provide 
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference 
by the ,SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs.0 As 
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of vio-
lence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but 
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respond-
ents failed to produce evidence establishing that double cell-
ing itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to 
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability of-
fered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did 
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates 
than jobs, had "water[ ed] down" jobs by assigning more in-
mates to each job than necessary and by reducing the num-
ber of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also-
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists 
and social workers since double celling had begun. 
• The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security 
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434 
F. Supp., at 1014. 
6 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to in-
mates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access 
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to 
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was· 
1omo delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id ., at 
1015. 
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial 
backlog of inmates needing routine dental care, but the dental staff treated' 





Despite these generally favorable findings, the District 
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and 
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five 
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms 
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only 
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and over-
crowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more in-
mates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In 
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding neces-
sarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well 
as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid. 
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of de-
cency several studies recommending that each person in an 
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters.7 
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square 
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who 
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with 
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac-
tice; it is not a temporary condition.0 
r The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual 
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27 
(1977) (60-80 square feet) ; National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail 
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime 
and- Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 
§ 1 ( 50 square feet). 
8 The baF'is of the Distrirt Court's assertion as to the amount of time 
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the rourt's opinion. 
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court found that 75% of the double celled 
inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their ceJls from 6:30 a. m. to 
0 p. m. 434 F . Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated thnt it made this 
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate cla ~sification, which 
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012. 
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single 
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially 
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate, 
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at 
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each 
of which the court rejected. It then ordered petitioners to reduce the-
0 
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OJ) p,ppeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\ 
petitipners argued that the 'District Court's conclusion must 
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling 
is per se unconstitutional. ·The· Court of Appeals disagreed; 
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that 
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the 
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opin-
ion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were. 
not clearly erroneous, its con"ciusions of law were "permissible 
from the findings," and its rem·edy was a reasonable response 
to the violations found.10 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question to prison administration, - U. S, 
- (1980). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the-
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson V. California, 370 u. s. 
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State 
may confine those convicted of · crimes. It is unquestioned" 
tha~ "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment 
subject _to scrutiny under the_ Eighth Amendment standards."" 
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, ·669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 5:20 (1979). But until this case, we have not con-
sidered a disputed contention that the conditions of confine-
ment at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusuar 
punishment.11 Nor have we had an occasion to consider spe-
inmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population·fell 
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for 
Cert., at A-39. 
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order· 
of !lffirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980). 
11 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison adminis--
tratiifs did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the conditiODfJ' 
; 
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·eifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that con-
ditions o'f confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We 
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the gen-
eral principles that are relevant to a State's authority to im.,_ 
pose pupishmept for criJUinal cenctuct. 
A 
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the 
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be 
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words 
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. '153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the 
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punish-
ments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson 
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 
(1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punish-
ments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia, 
8Upra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the sever-
ity of the crime, Coker v. Georgi,a, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 
(1910).12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of 
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-
in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was 
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cntel and 
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering 
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison 
bnttality . .. is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is 
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976). 
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can 
be made criminal and punished as such. Robin.son v. California, 370· 
U. s: 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involved 
in this case. 
8 
80-332-0PINIO N 
RHODES v. CHAPMAN 
tion/¥ Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Garnble~ 
.f29 u. s. 97, 103 ( 1976). 
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine 
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for 
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957) 
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that 
"Eighth Amendment judgments shodd neither be nor appear 
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rurnmel v. 
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Con-
1titution contemplates that in the end [a corrt's] own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the accepta-
bility" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182· 
{joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] should be in-
formed by objective factors to the maximum extent possi-
ble.'" Rurnmel v. Estelle, supra, at 275, quoting Coker v. 
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example, 
when the question was whether capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked 
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of 
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593-
596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib-
erate ·indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and 
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the 
·common law and sta.te legislatures, that "r a]n inmate must 
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the 
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429 
U. S. , at 103. 
·These principles apply when the conditions of confinement 
compose the pu11ishme11t at issue. Conditions must not in-· 
volve the wanton and unnecesrnry infliction of pain, nor may 
thi'y be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime 
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warranting imprisonment In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we 
held. that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual be- . 
cause, in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and , 
even ii1 less serious cases, it can result in pain without any 
penological purpose. 429 U. S .. at 103. In Hutto, supra, the 
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in un-
questioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs. 
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or· 
in combination , may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measme of life 's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel 
and unusual under the contemporary standard of derency 
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But 
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under· 
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the 
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, 
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for 
their offenses against society. 
B 
In view of the District Court's findings of fact , its con-
clusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is ingupportable. Virtually every one 
of the court's findings t~nds to refute respondents' claim. 
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated in-
crease in prison population did not lead to deprivations of 
essential food , medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase 
violence among inmates 01' create other conditions intolerable 
for prison confinement. 434 F. Supp. , at 1018. Although job-
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a 
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before-
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary 
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not 
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amend-
ment from its language and history to hold that delay of 
these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the Constitution, 
10 
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied 
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion. 
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served 
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more 
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of 
several studies that each inma.te have at least 50-55 square 
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled in-
mates spend most of their time· in their cells with their cell-
mates; and the fact that. double celling at SOCF was not a 
temporary condition. Supra, at -. These general con-
siderations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and 
unnsual punishment, for there· is no evidence that double 
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unneces~ary 
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of crimes warranting imprisonment.18 At most, these con-
siderations amount to a theory that double celling inflicts 
pain.14 · Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an idea1 
13 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions 
of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contem-
porary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., 
at 543.:.544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect 
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional 
minima; rather, they establish gonls recommended by the organization in 
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and · Jails 
1 (1980). Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily 
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude· 
toward a given sanction." Gregg v:' Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint 
opinion). We roukl agree that double celling i,- not desirable, especial!~· 
in view of the 8ize of these cells. But there is no evidrnce in thi8 case 
that double celling ii:: viewed generally a:; Yiolaling d2cency. Moreover, 
though small , the erlh, in SOCF are exceptional!~, mo<lern and functional; 
they are heated, ventilated, havp hot and cold running water, :rntl. a 
sanitary tolirt. En<'h cell 11!1:,:i has a radio. 434 F. Supp., at 1011. 
14 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for 
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and" 
violence. In respondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary 
and wanton pain if double celling led to rioting. The <larger of prison· 
·riots is a serious concern, shared by the public 11s well as by prison au-
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of 
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious 
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considera-
tions properly are weighed by the legislature and prison ad-
ministration rather than a court. There being no constitu-
tional violation,15 the District Court had no authority to con~ 
thorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the 
eonclusion thnt double celling at SOCF is cruel and um1sual, whatever 
may be 1 he si1 nation in a different, case. The District Court.'s findings 
of fort lrnd no i;upport to re:spondents' claim in this case. Moreover, a 
prison's internal security is peculiarly a mattrr normally left to the dis-
cretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra. at. 551, and 
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum. 433 U. S. 119, 
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 827 (1974). 
15 The dii;:scnting 011inion states that "the facility described by [the 
Court 1 is not the one involved in this case." Post, at -. The incor-
rectness of this statement is apparent from an examination of the facts set 
forth at, lrngth ahove, see ante, 2-4, and nn. 2- G, and the District Court's 
detailed findings of fact. See 434 F. Supp., at 1009-1018. 
In several instances, the dissent selectively relies on testimony without 
acknowledging that the District Court gave it little or no weight. For 
example, the dissent emphasizes the testimony of experts as to rsycho-
logical problems that "may be expected" from double celling; it also 
relies on similar testimony as to an increase in tension and aggression. 
Id ., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District 
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and 
physician that "there has been no increase [in violence] other than what 
one would expert from increased numbers [of inmates]." Id., at 1018. 
More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-thflt the District Court 
resolved this c•onflict in the testimony by holding "that there hftd been 
no increflse in violence or criminal activity increase due to double celling; 
there has been fan increase] due to increased population." Ibid. This 
holding was bnsed on uncontroverted prison records, required to be 
maintainrd by the Ohio Department of Corrections and desrribed by the· 
District Court as being "detail[ed] and bespeak[ing] credibility." Ibid. 
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court con-
cerning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required to· 
remain in their cells. The disse11t, post, at -, n. 6, relies only on 
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1ider whether double celling in light of these considerations 
was the best response to the · increase in Ohio's state-wide 
prison population. 
III 
This court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth 
Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] de-
fision that a given punishment is impermissible under the 
Eighth Amendment cannot pe reversed short of a constitu-
tional amendment," and thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in 
the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., 
at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement 
are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their· 
inquid.es "spring from constitutional requirements and that 
aelective findings that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours 
each day, and that others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp., 
at 1013. The dissent fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly 
inconsistent with a prior, twice-repeated, finding by the Court that in-
mates "have to be locked in their cell with their cellmate only from 
around 9:00 p. m. to 6:30 a. m.,'" id ., at 1013, 1012, leaving them free to 
move about for some 14 hours. Moreover, it is unquestioned-and also 
not mentioned by the diesent-that the inmates who spend most of their 
time locked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive classification." 
These include inmates found guilty of "rule infractions [after] a plenary 
he11ring" and inmates who "are there bv 'choice' at least to some degree." 
foi,d. It must be remembered that. SOCF is a ma.ximum-security prison, 
housing only persons guilty of ·violent and other serious crimes. It is 
tsSential to maintain a regime of close supervision and discipline. 
The dissent also makes much of the fact that SOCF was housing 38% 
more inmates at the time of trial than its "rated capacity." According· 
to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three factors influence 
prison population: the number of arrests, prosecution policies, and sen-
tencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can change rapidly, 
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to 
calibrate a prison's "rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of" 
prison population. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Cwiae 
3, t . The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF" 
guessed incorrectly about future prison population, but whether the actual" 
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judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a 
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539.16 
Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of 
cruel and unusual confinement, and conditions in a number of 
prisons, especially older ones, have justly been described as 
"deplorable" and "sorbid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562.17 
When conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual 
punishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect 
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison 
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974) . 
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, 
5 vols. (1980). It suffices here to repeat: 
"rT]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, 
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. 
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, 
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of 
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact re-
flecb no more thau a healthy Hense of realism." Procuuier v. Martinez, 
:mpra, al 405 (footnote omitted). 
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v. 
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977). 
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and 
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime 
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities. 
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early 
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "top-
flight, first-class facility." Supm, at 2. Yet, an unanticipated increase-
in the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at 
issue. 
17 Example:; of recent federal court decision,- holding pri:,mn conditions 
to be violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment:; include Ramus 
v. Lamm, 639 F. 2d 559 (CAl0 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1981) ; 
Williams v. Edwards. 547 F. 2d 1206 (CA5 1977); Gates , . Collier, 501 
F. 2d 1291 (CA5 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Sup., 318 (MD Ala. 1976), 
aff'd as modified, 559 F . 2d 288 (CA5 1977), rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiarn). 
14 
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constitutional rights." Procunwr v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 3961 
~05-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) 
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility, 
however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and 
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Con-
stitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how 
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal 
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and 
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens. 
In this case, the question before us is whether the condi-
tions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we 
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed. 
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CHAMBERS 01" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
..§uvrmtt QJcurl ltf tltt ~b ~buts 
jhudptr.gt~ ,. QJ. 2.llp'.Jl., 
Re: No. 80-332 - Rhodes v. Chapman 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your separate concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 6/13/81 80- 332 Rhodes v. Chapman 
This case is here on a writ of certiorari to the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It concerns the 
conditions of confinement/at a state maximum security 
prison,/ the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. 
The question is whether the housing of two inmates -
in one cell - a practice known as double-celling - is cruel 
and unusual punishment/ in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
The facts are not in dispute. The prison/ 
completed in 1972 ,/is one of the most modern/and best 
equipped in the United States. The double-celling problem 
aroso/because of an unanticipated increase in Ohio's prison 
population. 
At the time of trial, 1,400 inmates - out o~ a 
~~ total of 2,300 - were double-celled. The cells Asmall 
0'3 
for double occupancy, being 63 square feet. Yet, they are -
exceptionally modern and functional; they are heated, ~ 
ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and sanitary 
toilets. Each cell has its own radio. 
• ... 
The courts below nevertheless held / that this 
double-celling constitued cruel and unusual punishment. 
2. 
We think such a holding goes beyond any prior 
decision of this Court. The standard / established by our 
cases/ is that the Constitution is not violated/unless the 
punishment is gross?aisproportionate/ to the severity of 
the crime }gf involves the wanton/ and unnecessary infliction 
of pain. The facts in this case/ fall far short of meeting 
this standard. 
Federal courts ar-;-'sensitive to their dut/ to 
scrutinize carefully/ claims of cruel and unusual 
confinement. Conditions in many prisons, especially older 
ones, have been held to be intolerable. 
such a case. 
But this is not 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens, has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. 
Justice Blackmun also has filed a concurring opinion. 
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N ~ ii mt s COURT ALLOWS TWO / 
Jun t t to I qq,, IN A CELL FOR ONE 
' .. r;:; .... 
if!__igh Courf Rules 
T~_May BeP,ut 
· · ln·a-· Cell for One 
... I • ; • "'! ·, r. 
Pl~ ~f Cru~l Punuhme~t 
In Ohio Prucin Re)ected , 
•• • • # I 
By lJNDA GREENHOUSE · 
'. ,: ·· Special!O'Ibel'fawYcnnm. ,:'', 
WASHINGTON, June 15 - The ' su:;· 
preme Court ruled today that two prison-
ers may be confined in a cell designed for 
only one as long as _the overall prison 
conditions do not violate a "contempo. 
rary standard of decency._'' 
The ~l decision overturned rulings 
' by two Federal courts in Ohio, where · 
1,400 inmates at the state's maximum se--
curity prison were required to double up 
in 63-square-foot cells designed to house 
oneperson. 
In another case dealt with today, the 
Court unanimously upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Federal strip mining law 
as Interior Secretary J~ G. Watt was 
taking action to cut back the staff of the 
agency that is-charged with enforcing it. 
[PageB9.J-
The Court also ruled unanimously that 
recent Federal health planning legisla-
tion designed to end the construction of 
. excess hospital beds did DOt leave private 
insurers free to refuse to deal with hospi-
tals they regard as surplus or unneces. 
sary. (PageDl.J 
I 
Prison Called 'Top-Flight' 
In the Ohio prison case, the lower 
courts had ruled that the doubllng up con-
stituted cruel and unusual punuhment, 
which _is prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution. 
Writing for the majority today, Associ-
., ate Justice Lewis P. Powell Jr. said that 
"whatever may be the situation in a dif-
ferent case" the lower courts' application 
of the Eighth Amendment to the Ohio 
prison was "insupportable." . 
He· said that the ~year-old prison, 
the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
at Lucasville, had been found by the Fed-
eral District Co'Jl1 to be "unquestionably 
a tOI>fligbt. first.class facility," with 
adequate food. medical care, sanitation 
and llbrary resources. There was no evi-
dence, Justice Powell said, that the dou-
' Cootmued on Pap Bt, Column 1 
-~ 1 ------
Continued From Pa1e Al . 
· ,. ble-celllng had led to an increase in vio-
. ;.· 1ence. 1 . . · • : ·_- _ 
,. "There is no evidence," he continued, 
- ~~ "that double-celling under thele circum-
: stances either lnfllcts iµineceuary or 
::;, wanton pain or, is groaly disporportion-
~ ate to the severity of crimes warrantins 
_;.imprisonment.'.' ' / 
,., Conclusiona to the contrary; Justice 
- Powell said. perhaps "1'9fiect an aspira-
_ ... tion toward an ideal environment for 
: __ long-term confinement.'' But he added: 
'. · · "The Constitution do8I not mandate com.: 
:;;: fortable prisons." 
- · The case, Rhodes v. Chapman, No. 80-
~ -: 332, was the first Supreme Court case to 
- - -analyze conditions of confinement, as op-
.. posed to the sentence itself, under the 
..:.· ·~ Eighth Amendment. It attracted wid&-
7 spread attention from groups concerned 
with prisoners' rights and from such or-
ganizations as the American Medical A!r 
sociation and the American Pubtic 
Health Association. 
• Together, the associations filed a brief 
__ telling the Court that a "broad consensus 
::·of epidemiological, medical and psycho-
"·:1og1cal findings" supports a minimum re- · 
: --quirementof 60 square feet per prisoner. 
:;~ Because two-thirds of allfederal, state 
..,-and local prisoners in the country are 
: .·confined in less space than that proposed 
,,.; minimum, a ruling by the Court that the 
~~Constitution forbids doubl~elllng or re-
quires 60 square feet per person would · 
have had a substantial dislocating effect 
on the nation's prisons. 
Since the Court today left open the pos-
sibility that double-<:elling might be un-
constitutional in a different setting, the 
decision is unlikely to end litigation over 
prison conditions. Prison conditions in 
two dozen states have been ruled uncon-
stitutional by various Federal and state 
-courts, for the most part on the basis of a 
liumber of factors in addition to doubl&-
, ulllng. Such decisions based on a "total-
,.lty of the circumstances" analysis would 
: .~ unaffected by today's ruling. 
. : ;J; ~ >l 
Five for Majority Opinion 
;._,__ Only four members of the Court joined 
Justice Powell in his opinion: Associate 
Justices Potter Stewart, Byron R. White 
and William H. Rehnquist and Chief Ju,. 
lice ·warren E. Burger, who has made 
-several recent speeches deploring prison 
,j:ondit1ons. . L : · , :-
• Associate Justice Wllliam J. Brennan 
:Jr. filed a separate concurring opinion, in 
which he was joined by Associate Jus-
tices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul 
SteVens. . • · · 
_ The only dissenting Justice, Thurgood 
. - "Marshall, warned that the majority optn. 
ion could be a "step toward abandoning" 
the Federal courts' important role in 
safeguarding the protections of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
- Other actions by the Court today in-
.! _:eluded_ these: , ; 
... 
,/ :!,,, • ., 
Right to Travel ·. -' ,,.._ · 
The Justices unanimously upheld a 
Georgia law that made the abandonmf!Dt 
of a child a more serious offense if the 
abandoning pa.rent left the state iestead I 
of remaining in Get:qla. The Georgia s~ , 
preme Court had found the law constitu-
tional, but the United States Court of A~ 
:pea1s for the Fifth Circuit struck it down 
on the ground that it lnfrtngecl the funda-
mental constitutional right to interstate 
travel. . 
- Justice Stevens wrote the decision.· 
Jones v. Helms, No. 80-850. He said that 
while the right to travel was a tundamen-
. tal right in ordinary circumstances, the 
"criminal conduct" of the defendant in 
today's case "necesaarlly qualified his 
right thereafter fn!ely to travel inter-
state." The defendant, Bobby Helms, 
failed to pay for the support of his daugh-
ter and moved to Alabama. 
Information Release 
The Court agreed to hear an appeal by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 
a rul~ that information collected for 
law enforcement purposes loses its ex-
emption from disclosure if it ls later used 
for other purposes. 
The case, F.B.I. v. Abramson, No. 80-
1735, involves documents that were for-
warded by the agency to aides to Presi-
dent Nixon. The documents concerned 
various political opponents of the Nixon 
Administration. They were requested by 
Howard S. AbraD19011, now a freelance ' 
journalist, under the Freedom of Infor-J 
matlon Act, and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
lrdered them disclosed on the groundj 
hat the original exemption of investiga-1 
1ry records no longer applied. In its Su-! 
, ·:eme Court appeal, the F.B.I. is arguing 
1,_.at the ruling compromises the personal 
_>r.lvacy of those involved. 
' Aff.mnative Action 
Til\~ Court declined to hear challenges 
to aft: lrmative action plans adopted by 
the cil.'.ies of Detroit and Seattle to i.n-1 
crease .minority representation in their 
uniform,!!d services. Both cases had been \ 
pending at the Court for nearly 18 
months. '-The Justices gave no explana-1 
tion for n1fuslng to hear the cases, Maeh-
ren v. Seat:tle, No. 79-1061, and Detroit Po-
lice Office1~~- v. Young, No. 79-1080. 
~'lr., ! 
N"f Timt_s 
Jun t ··1 ~, l q ?'t 
.. ~ •· .-. :10:~·-t,·:1,r -~,, , ,.. __ .. ,~ 
Quotation of the Day. 
"The Corutttution does not mandate . 
comfortable prisons:"'. - Associate 
Justtce Lewis F. Powell Jr. [B9: l.J 
,· .. c t:._____.__ ___ _ 
. ' ! 
, .. 
·-
Richmond Times Dispatch, June 24, 1981 
Prisone.rs' Rights 
' . 
Most · Americans undoubtedly , advice which Justice Powell seemed 
view with approval the _ U.S. to be aiming in their direction. The 
Supreme Court's recent decision courts do have a responsibility to 
that it is not "cruel and unusual . scrutinize claims of cruel 'and uri-
punishment" to place two prisoner!! usual confinement:declared,Justice 
in one cell. . Powell, but "in discharging this 
Two inmates of the Southern Ohio oversight responsibility, however, · 
Correctional Facility filed suit on courts cannot assume that state 
the grounds that "double-celling" : legislatures and'prison officials are 
violated their constitutional rights insensitive to the requirements of 
under the Eighth Amendment. A · the Constitution or to th~ perplexing 
federal district court decided in' ;; sociological problems of ho_w best to 
their favor, and that decision was . achieve the goals of the penal func-
sustained by a federal appeals . tion in the criminal justice system: 
tribunal. But eight of the nine inem- ~ to punish justly, to deter future 
bersof the U .S.,SupremeCourtfound / crime, and to return imprisoned per-
no constitutional violation. 1 sons to society with an improved 
Writing for himself and four other, , ' chance of being useful, law-abiding 
members, Justice Lewis F. Powell citizens ." 
Jr. said that conditions of confine- Three justices· who agreed with 
ment "must nQt involve the wanton the judgment in the case filed a 
and unnecessary infliction of pain, separate concurring opinion "to 
nor may they be grossly dispropor- emphasize that today's _decision 
tionate to the severity of the crime should in no way be construed as a 
warranting imprisonment." But, he retreat from careful judicial 
said, "to the extent that such con- scrutiny of prison conditions .... " 
ditions are restrictive and even The decision may not represent a 
harsh, they are part of the penalty "retreat," but it may have an in-
that criminal offenders pay for their fluence on lower court judges when 
offenses against society." they consider the multitude of com-
Federal judges who sometimes plaints from prisoners (more than 
have been going to the extreme in 8,000 cases are pending) alleging 
mandating changes in state penal violations of their constitutional 
operations sho~1ld take note of a bit of rights. 
